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ARTICLES
WILL SUBSTITUTES UNDER THE REVISED
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
Grayson M.P. McCouch*
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed a dramatic increase in probate
avoidance. Revocable trusts, joint-and-survivor or pay-on-death
("POD") bank accounts, transfer-on-death ("TOD") security re-
gistrations and other will substitutes have proliferated and
emerged as successful competitors of the probate system. In re-
sponse to this "nonprobate revolution,"' the drafters of the Uni-
form Probate Code ("UPC")2 have begun to reconsider the scope
and direction of probate reform.' The 1989 and 1990 UPC revi-
sions reflect a new emphasis on integrating the law of probate
* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. The author would like to
thank Professors John T. Gaubatz, Thomas A. Robinson, Lawrence W. Waggoner and
Thomas L. Waterbury for their helpful comments.
I See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of
Succession, 97 HARv. L. Rv. 1108 (1984).
2 UNIF. PROBATE CODE, 8A U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1992). In the present discussion, refer-
ences to the UPC include amendments through 1991 except when indicated by specific
reference to the pre-1989 version of UPC article 6 or the pre-1990 version of article 2.
Technical amendments proposed in 1993 are noted where appropriate.
On the background and structure of the UPC generally, see Lawrence H. Averill, Jr.,
An Eclectic History and Analysis of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code, 55 AL. L REv.
891 (1992); William F. Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 NY U L.
Rav. 1037 (1966); Richard V. Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Re-
form in the 70's, 2 CONN. L. Rav. 453 (1970); James N. Zartman, An Illinois Critique of
the Uniform Probate Code, 1970 U. ILL LF. 413.
3 [W]ill substitutes and other inter-vivos transfers have so proliferated that
they now constitute a major, if not the major, form of wealth transmission....
The proliferation of will substitutes and other inter-vivos transfers is recog-
nized, mainly, in measures tending to bring the law of probate and nonprobate
transfers into greater unison.
UPC, art. 2 prefatory note.
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and nonprobate transfers.
Nevertheless, the nonprobate revolution remains incom-
plete. Although the revised UPC establishes uniform construc-
tional rules for wills and will substitutes, its approach to validat-
ing will substitutes requires rethinking. The failure to address
creditors' rights with respect to nonprobate assets other than
multiple-person accounts represents another serious gap in the
present UPC. Solutions for these and other problems call for a
careful balancing of the respective formal and functional charac-
teristics of wills and will substitutes.
This Article explores the impact of the revised UPC on will
substitutes and recommends further revisions in the areas of
validation and creditor protection. Part I examines the problem
of defining and validating nonprobate transfers. Part II dis-
cusses the background and operation of specific constructional
rules for will substitutes under the revised UPC. Part III ana-
lyzes the need to protect the rights of creditors and other third
parties while preserving flexibility and efficiency in implement-
ing will substitutes. Finally, the Article concludes with a brief
summary and recommendations for further reform.
I. VALIDATION OF NONPROBATE TRANSFERS
Will substitutes include many different arrangements for
transferring property outside the probate system to designated
beneficiaries at the owner's death.4 Although they resemble wills
in function, conventional will substitutes take the form of life-
time transactions. In some cases, however, courts anxious to pro-
tect the integrity of the probate system routinely deny disposi-
tive effect to any "testamentary" arrangement that fails to
comply with will formalities. In response, the UPC's validating
statute simply declares a broad range of will substitutes "non-
testamentary" without differentiating them from wills in form or
substance.
A. Testamentary and Nontestamentary Transfers
Each state has its own probate system governing identifica-
tion of successors, probate of wills and administration of dece-
' For a list of common will substitutes, see 1 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H.
PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 6.1, at 219 (rev. ed. 1960 & Supp. 1992).
[Vol. 58:1123
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dents' estates.5 Despite variations in particular substantive and
procedural provisions, state probate codes generally subject a
decedent's property to administration6 and recognize a valid will
as the exclusive method for affirmatively directing the disposi-
tion of property owned at death. To the extent not effectively
disposed of by will, the net probate estate (after paying statu-
tory allowances, expenses of administration and other claims)
passes by intestacy.7 Moreover, a will generally becomes enforce-
able only if it is executed with prescribed formalities and admit-
ted to probate." Courts eager to preserve the primacy of the pro-
bate system often assume that any deathtime disposition that
could have been accomplished by will cannot be achieved in any
other manner.9
Accordingly, conventional will substitutes take the form of
lifetime transfers, trusts, contracts or joint tenancies. Techni-
cally, they avoid the reach of the probate system by disposing of
property during life, leaving the owner only with rights or inter-
ests that terminate at death.10 To the extent that a will substi-
tute leaves the owner with practically undiminished possession,
enjoyment and control of the property, however, its validity may
come into question. If a particular arrangement is not recognized
as an effective lifetime disposition, the property becomes part of
5 Technically, "probate" refers to the process of determining the validity of a will,
while "administration" refers to the process in which a court-appointed personal repre-
sentative collects the decedent's property, pays statutory allowances, taxes and claims,
and distributes the remaining property to the decedent's successors. The term "probate"
is often used more broadly to cover both aspects of estate settlement. See MAx RHmxu-
STEIN & MARY ANNG LENDON, THE LAw oF DEDENTs' E TATEs 477-78 (1971).
6 See UPC § 3-101 (estate subject to administration). Administration may be sub-
stantially simplified or dispensed with in certain cases. See id. §§ 3-312 to -322 (univer-
sal succession), 3-1201 to -1204 (collection by affidavit, summary administration).
I See UPC §§ 2-101 (intestate succession), 3-101 (devolution to devisecs or "in the
absence of testamentary disposition" to heirs). A decedents "probate estate" comprises
all "probate assets," i.e., property owned by the decedent at death. See UPC §§ 1-
201(14) (definition of estate), 1-201(39) (definition of property).
I See UPC §§ 2-502 (will formalities), 3-102 (will proves transfer only if declared
valid in probate proceeding).
1 Professor Langbein has coined the term "probate monopoly theory" to describe
the assumption "that will-like results may be achieved only by instruments that are vills
and that invoke the probate system." Langbein, supra note 1, at 1129.
'0 If the owner's interest in property or under a contract terminates at death, the
underlying property is not included in the probate estate. Thus, the probate estate might
be viewed as "a residual entity containing only the property not disposed of by will sub-
stitute." Id. at 1129-30. Of course, the conclusion that a will substitute removes property
from the probate estate assumes the validity of the will substitute.
1993]
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the owner's probate estate at death and passes to the owner's
testate or intestate successors, subject in most cases to adminis-
tration. Courts describe invalid will substitutes as "testamen-
tary"; this label expresses, but does not explain, the conclusion
that the attempted disposition is ineffective.
The distinction between testamentary and nontestamentary
dispositions has generated much doctrinal confusion and uncer-
tainty." A will is often described as "ambulatory"-it has no
dispositive effect until the testator's death and remains revoca-
ble until then. 12 By contrast, a lifetime disposition is normally
viewed as having some dispositive effect during life: an outright
conveyance or gift transfers an "interest" in property; an inter
vivos trust involves a fiduciary relationship with respect to spe-
cific property; a contract creates "rights" in the parties (and in
third-party beneficiaries). The interests or rights may amount to
little more than a present possibility of future possession and
enjoyment, subject in some cases to revocation or change. By
fragmenting ownership into present and future interests, sepa-
rating legal title from beneficial rights, or exchanging property
for an obligation to make future payments, property owners may
tailor an arrangement to meet the formal requirements of a life-
time disposition while preserving substantially unrestricted
ownership.
Some will substitutes, such as revocable trusts 3 and benefi-
" On the classification and operation of will substitutes generally, see Olin L. Brow-
der, Giving or Leaving-What is a Will?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 845 (1977); Ashbel G. Gulliver
& Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1 (1941);
Langbein, supra note 1; William M. McGovern, Jr., The Payable On Death Account and
Other Will Substitutes, 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 7 (1972); John Ritchie, What Is a Will?, 49 VA.
L. REV. 759 (1963); Edward M. Wagner, Note, Non-Probate Transfers-Provisions Re-
lating to Effect of Death: Will UPC § 6-201 Be "Effective" in Nebraska?, 12 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 1173, 1184-1201 (1979); Richard V. Wellman, Transfer-On-Death Securities Re-
gistration: A New Title Form, 21 GA. L. REV. 789 (1987).
"2 See Percy Bordwell, Testamentary Dispositions, 19 KY. L.J. 281 (1931); THOMAS
E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 1, at 1 (2d ed. 1953); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Donative Transfers) § 33.1 (1990) (defining will as "a don-
ative document of transfer intended to be legally operative to effect a transfer of prop-
erty upon the donor's death," subject to required formalities). Professor Browder notes
that some find it odd to speak of revoking a disposition before it takes effect. Browder,
supra note 11, at 850. Others may find it equally odd to insist that a disposition take
effect before it can be revoked.
3 See, e.g., Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. 1955) (declaration of trust);
National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 53 N.E.2d 113, 121-25 (Mass. 1944) (transfer in trust).
On revocable trusts generally, see IA AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW
[Vol. 58:1123
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ciary designations under life insurance policies14  or pension
plans,15 have achieved wide acceptance. In the absence of a vali-
dating statute, other will substitutes continue to breed litigation,
with mixed results. For example, courts have traditionally re-
fused to recognize a surviving POD beneficiary's interest in a
bank account"' and have not hesitated to look behind the form
of joint bank accounts.17 Similarly, a common-law joint ten-
ancy18 may fail if a court finds that the person who contributed
OF TRUSTS § 57, at 124-91 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter Scorr].
, See, e.g., Gurnett v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 191 N.E. 250 (I1. 1934); Gordon
v. Portland Trust Bank, 271 P.2d 653 (Or. 1954). On the beneficiary's interest in a life
insurance policy, see 4 GEORGE J. COUCH & RONALD A. ANDERSON, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSUR-
ANCE LAW §§ 27:57-:64, at 676-94 (2d ed. rev. Mark S. Rhodes 1984) (hereinafter Couctl;
Scorr, supra note 13, § 57.3, at 148-66.
"I See, e.g., Hart v. Savings & Profit Sharing Pension Fund, 291 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.
Va. 1968); Buehler v. Buehler, 323 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); see also Davis v.
Wark, 217 Cal. Rptr. 734 (Cal. CL App. 1985) (individual retirement account); In re
Koss, 150 A. 360 (N.J. Eq. 1930) (corporate stock purchase plan).
16 See, e.g., Truax v. Southwestern College, 522 P.2d 412 (Kan. 1974); In re Will of
Collier, 381 So. 2d 1338 (Miss. 1980); Young v. McCoy, 40 N.W.2d 540 (Neb. 1950); Blais
v. Colebrook Guar. Sav. Bank, 220 A.2d 763 (N.H. 1966); Waitran v. Waitran, 505 P.2d
171 (Okla. 1972); Brown's Estate, 22 A.2d 821 (Pa. 1941); Northwestern Nat'l Bank v.
Daniel, 127 N.W.2d 714 (S.D. 1964); Tucker v. Simrow, 21 N.W.2d 252 (Wis. 1946). But
see In re Estate of Wright, 308 N.E.2d 319 (111. App. Ct. 1974) (upholding POD account
on alternative grounds of tentative trust or contract); Butler State Bank v. Duncan, 319
S.W.2d 913 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (upholding POD account as tentative trust); Peoples
Bank v. Baxter, 298 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. CL App. 1957) (upholding POD certificate of
deposit on contract theory, without addressing issue of testamentary character); see gen-
erally McGovern, supra note 11, at 9.
17 The form of a joint bank account is inherently ambiguous: if A opens an account
in the name of "A or B or the survivor," A may intend to create in B (1) a present
beneficial right coupled with a survivorship right, (2) merely a survivorship right (a POD
account), or (3) merely a right to withdraw funds on behalf of A (an agency account). In
the absence of an applicable statute, courts have traditionally refused to recognize survi-
vorship rights in a joint account that confers no beneficial rights on the co-tenant during
the depositor's life. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Meyer, 380 S.W.2d 315, 321-23 (Mo. 1964) (cer-
tificates of deposit); Barbour v. First Citizens Nat'l Bank, 86 N.W.2d 526 (S.D. 1957)
(bank account). On joint bank accounts generally, see Donald Kepner, The Joint and
Survivorship Bank Account-A Concept Without a Name, 41 CAL L. Ray 596 (1953);
Donald Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Bank Account Muddle, 26 U CiL L. RE%'
376 (1959); Richard V. Wellman, The Joint and SuriVor Account in Michi-
gan-Progress Through Confusion, 63 MIci. L. REv. 629 (1965).
Is All too frequently, a person takes title to property in joint tenancy form solely to
avoid probate, without intending to confer any present right to possession or control on
the co-tenant. A dispute may arise if the person who contributed consideration attempts
to revoke the entire arrangement or the co-tenant attempts to sever the joint tenancy.
On joint tenancies generally, see N. William Hines, Real Property Joint Tenancies: Law,
Fact and Fancy, 51 IowA L. REv. 582 (1966); N. William Hines, Personal Property Joint
Tenancies: More Law, Fact and Fancy, 54 MINN. L. Rav. 509 (1970) [hereinafter Hines,
1993]
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consideration intended to create a revocable survivorship right
while retaining undiminished lifetime ownership of the underly-
ing property."9 Faced with a deed that expressly purports to
"take effect" at the grantor's death, a court may just as readily
strike down the transfer as uphold it.
20
In attempting to rationalize the disparate treatment of sub-
stantially equivalent will substitutes, courts have resorted to for-
malistic distinctions. 1 While rejecting POD bank accounts, for
example, courts have accepted the "tentative trust" doctrine,
which authorizes the transfer at death of a savings account bal-
ance subject to an implied survivorship condition and an implied
power of revocation.2 2 Without relaxing the constraints of com-
mon-law joint tenancy doctrine for most types of property,
courts have developed ingenious special rules to circumvent
those constraints in cases concerning joint bank accounts.2 3
More Law].
"' See, e.g., Blanchette v. Blanchette, 287 N.E.2d 459 (Mass. 1972) (corporate stock);
Hughes v. Hughes, 678 P.2d 702 (N.M. 1984) (land); Kinney v. Ewing, 492 P.2d 636
(N.M. 1972) (corporate stock); Neuschafer v. McHale, 709 P.2d 734 (Or. Ct. App. 1985)
(corporate stock). Occasionally, however, courts refuse to look behind the form of a joint
tenancy. See, e.g., Pollock v. Brown, 569 S.W.2d 724, 733-34 (Mo. 1978) (land); Main v.
Howard, 629 P.2d 870 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (corporate stock).
20 Courts that strike down such transfers characterize them as testamentary. See,
e.g., Gardner v. Thames, 154 S.E.2d 926 (Ga. 1967); Armstrong v. Shell, 26 So. 2d 344
(Miss. 1946); Wheeler v. Rines, 375 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1964); Butler v. Sherwood, 196 A.D.
603, 188 N.Y.S. 242 (1921). Courts that uphold such transfers characterize them as pre-
sent transfers with postponed possession. See, e.g., Innes v. Potter, 153 N.W. 604 (Minn.
1915); Barker v. Barker, 219 S.W.2d 391 (Mo. 1949); Cook v. Daniels, 306 S.W.2d 573
(Mo. 1957); Vigil v. Sandoval, 741 P.2d 836 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987).
2'1 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 11, at 18 (describing passing-of-an-interest test
as a "vague and abstract criterion" which "has achieved respectability as the verbal
clothing of the result"); Langbein, supra note 1, at 1126-29 (criticizing use of "doctrinal
ruses" to disguise will substitutes as lifetime transfers).
22 A tentative trust arises with respect to the deathtime balance of a savings account
established in the name of the depositor as trustee for another, without any further for-
malities; unlike other express trusts, a tentative trust becomes enforceable only at the
depositor's death and may be revoked by the depositor by will or by withdrawing funds
from the account during life. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 (1957); see,
e.g., In re Estate of Petralia, 204 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1965); In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E.
748 (1904). Professor Scott observes that a tentative trust is "a very thin trust and could
easily be held to be testamentary." SCOTT, supra note 13, § 58.3, at 201.
Occasionally, courts use trust doctrine to uphold a POD bank account. See, e.g., In
re Estate of Wright, 308 N.E.2d 319 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); Butler State Bank v. Duncan,
319 S.W.2d 913 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
22 In interpreting bank protection statutes to authorize a "statutory" joint tenancy
where each tenant enjoys presumptive beneficial ownership during life in proportion to
net contributions coupled with a presumptive right of survivorship, courts abandon the
[Vol. 58:1123
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While refusing to recognize contractual provisions for deathtime
dispositions of bank accounts, courts have invoked third-party-
beneficiary doctrine to uphold beneficiary designations in life in-
surance policies and annuities.2
Several commentators attempt to explain judicial treatment
of will substitutes in functional terms, emphasizing the opera-
tion and purpose of particular arrangements rather than their
formal classification. Under a functional view, a governing in-
strument that reliably reflects an owner's voluntary and deliber-
ate wishes concerning the disposition of property at death
should not fail merely because it fails to comply with will for-
malities. 5 For example, the settlor of a revocable trust typically
executes a written trust declaration or agreement in relatively
standard form setting forth the essential dispositive and admin-
common-law unities and acknowledge a survivorship right independent of co-ovmership
during life. See, e.g., In re Wimmer's Estate, 260 N.W. 655 (Wis. 1935).
2" See Fratcher, supra note 2, at 1084; McGovern, supra note 11, at 10-11. If a life
insurance company agrees to pay an annuity to an individual for life and a fixed amount
at death to the individual's estate or designated beneficiary, the arrangement may be
upheld as a third-party-beneficiary contract. See, e.g., Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v.
Ellis, 125 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1942); Zimmerman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 156 F. Supp. 589
(N.D. Ala. 1957); Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Rainey, 182 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1944). But ef.
Wilhoit v. Peoples Life Ins. Co., 218 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1955). Despite widespread judicial
hostility to POD accounts, courts occasionally invoke third-party-beneficiary contract
analysis in interpreting bank-protection statutes to validate POD accounts. See, eg., Lo-
gan v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 460 So. 2d 1239 (Ala. 1984); Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Harris,
257 S.E.2d 867 (Va. 1979); see also Peoples Bank v. Baxter, 298 SAN.2d 732 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1957) (upholding POD certificate of deposit on contract theory, vithout addressing
issue of testamentary character).
25 See Browder, supra note 11, at 851-54 (advocating validity of wil substitute if
transaction creates no greater risk than typical lifetime transaction or provides "compa-
rable substitute for the formal requirements for wills"); Lawrence M. Friedman, The
Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property, Succession and Society, 1966 Wms L.
REv. 340, 368 ("regularized and formal course of practice of business or social institu-
tions"); John T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 Mma, L. Ra ;
497, 561 (1977) ("That some forms of expression are prima facie valid does not, however,
require that all other forms of expression be held invalid .... [Many expressions of
testamentary intent that do not comply with will formalities] could resonably be vali-
dated, so long as the basic elements of a valid testament-testamentary intent, disposi-
tive scheme, and lack of influence-could be proved by clear and convincing evidence.");
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 11, at 17 (advocating "functional test" for validity of will
substitutes based on substantial performance of ritual and evidentiary functions of will
formalities); Langbein, supra note 1, at 1130-32 ("alternative formality" as a test for
excusing compliance with will formalities); Ritchie, supra note 11, at 765-67 (adequacy of
safeguards provided by will substitutes against abuses at which will formalities are
aimed).
1993]
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istrative terms of the trust.26 Similarly, life insurance companies
and pension plan administrators normally accept beneficiary
designations only in standard form over the signature of the pol-
icy owner or plan participant. Furthermore, under a functional
view, a will substitute that provides a reliable mechanism for
transferring property to the intended beneficiaries should not
fail merely because it bypasses the probate system. In the case
of a revocable trust, the trustee is responsible for transferring
property to the beneficiaries after the settlor's death; in the case
of a life insurance policy or pension plan, the institutions that
administer these arrangements tend to be able to implement
routine transfers more efficiently than the probate system.28
Courts, however, have often refused to validate POD ac-
counts and other contractual arrangements for deathtime trans-
fers.29 When these arrangements fail, the underlying property
often passes in a manner clearly not intended by the decedent,
usually after expensive and time-consuming litigation. In view of
the judicial acceptance of revocable trusts and beneficiary desig-
nations in life insurance policies and pension plans, there ap-
pears to be no reason to deny similar treatment for POD ac-
counts or other contractual arrangements for deathtime
property dispositions. Indeed, recognizing such contractual ar-
rangements as valid will substitutes would encourage property
owners to use them instead of more cumbersome, problematic
28 In theory, if the Statute of Frauds does not apply, a trust may be purely oral. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 17 (trust creation), 39 (no writing required at com-
mon law) (1957). Because of the evidentiary problems in proving the existence and terms
of an oral trust, however, courts tend to scrutinize such arrangements carefully. See, e.g.,
Monell v. College of Physicians and Surgeons, 17 Cal. Rptr. 744 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961)
(invalid oral trust of money).
217 Administration generally involves collecting assets, resolving claims and distribut-
ing the remaining property to rightful successors. See supra note 5. Collection and distri-
bution of the underlying property tend to be no more burdensome for a will substitute
than for a lifetime transfer. In addition, the availability of the probate system as a
"backstop" may reduce the need for creditor protection. See Langbein, supra note 1, at
1120. For a discussion of creditor protection, see infra Part III.C.
28 See Langbein, supra note 1, at 1119.
29 From a functional perspective, the form of a POD bank account probably reflects
the depositor's intent more reliably than the form of a tentative trust (which may be
intended to create a revocable trust, an irrevocable trust or no trust at all) or a joint
account (which may be intended as a joint tenancy, a POD account or an agency ac-
count). The 1989 UPC revisions eliminate trust accounts as a separate category and treat
them as POD accounts. See UPC § 6-201 cmt.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
ERTY (Donative Transfers) § 32.4 cmt. d (1990) (recognizing POD designations).
[Vol. 58:1123
WILL SUBSTITUTES
arrangements. Undoubtedly, the uneven judicial response to will
substitutes accounts in large part for the statutory solution
adopted by the UPC drafters.
B. Validation Under the UPC
The UPC declares, with disarming simplicity, that "[a] pro-
vision for a nonprobate transfer on death in [certain arrange-
ments] is nontestamentary."3 This blanket validating statute is
intended primarily to confirm that certain types of written will
substitutes need not comply with will formalities or be admitted
to probate, and that the underlying property is not subject to
administration s.3  Technically, the statute operates in a rather
backhanded manner by preventing certain dispositions from be-
ing struck down solely on account of their "testamentary" char-
acterization. 2 The validating statute does not affirmatively
grant dispositive effect to any will substitute, nor does it defeat
will substitutes that fall outside its scope. Just what it does ac-
complish is less certain. Read literally, the validating statute
states a tautology that has no operative effect. Under a more
liberal reading, however, it may operate far beyond its intended
scope. 3
30 UPC § 6-101(a). The UPC validates multiple-person accounts and TOD security
registrations in similar terms. See id. §§ 6-214 (multiple-person account "not testamen-
tary or subject to [provisions concerning estate administration)"), 6-309 (TOD security
registration "not testamentary"). For background on this provision and its predecessor
(section 6-201(a) of the original UPC), see Langbein, supra note 1, at 1108, 1132.34;
Wagner, supra note 11; Wellman, supra note 2, at 483.85.
31 Because the modes of transfer authorized by an instrument under this sec-
tion are declared to be nontestamentary, the instrument does not have to be
executed in compliance with the formalities for wills...; nor does the instru-
ment have to be probated, nor does the personal representative have any
power or duty with respect to the assets.... The sole purpose of this section is
to prevent the transfers authorized here from being treated as testamentary.
UPC § 6-101 cmL
Arguably, validation could be achieved less circuitously by the semantic short-cut
of declaring will substitutes "testamentary, but valid." See Diane C. Amado, Note, Uni-
form Probate Code Section 6-201: A Proposal to Include Stocks and Afutual Funds, 72
CORNELL L R v. 397, 416 (1987). By obliterating the distinction between wills and will
substitutes, this approach raises the interesting (though probably unintended) possibility
that a will substitute might revoke a previously-executed will or that property disposed
of by will substitute might be subject to administration.
See Richard W. Effland, Rights of Creditors in Nonprobate Assets, 48 Mo. L
REv. 431, 434 (1983) (observing that the statute, though not yet widely used, "may well
prove to be a sleeper because of its broad wording"); Wagner, supra note 11, at 1206
1993]
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The validating statute applies to a provision for a nonpro-
bate transfer at death in several enumerated arrangements-for
example, a life insurance policy, security, account agreement,
employee benefit plan, trust, conveyance or gift-or in any
"other written instrument of a similar nature. ' 34 Apparently, the
statute contemplates that the dispositive terms of the contract,
trust or transfer, including the provision for a nonprobate trans-
fer, are to be embodied in a written instrument, but specifies no
minimum requirements concerning the form or content of the
instrument.35 The beneficiary of a nonprobate transfer may be
designated by the decedent either in the written instrument or
in a separate writing, which may be "executed" before, after or
at the same time as the written instrument 36 Although the stat-
ute does not define the term "nonprobate transfer," it does iden-
tify three general types of permitted deathtime dispositions with
respect to money, property or other benefits owned or controlled
by a decedent immediately before death: (1) payment of money
or other benefits, (2) cancellation of outstanding indebtedness,
and (3) transfer of property that is the subject of a written
instrument.3
7
(arguing that the statute has little effect on existing law); Wellman, supra note 2, at 484
("[The validating statute] might prove to be a very important provision of the Code. On
the other hand, it could be viewed as adding nothing to existing case law."); Wellman,
supra note 11, at 809 n.58 (conceding that the catch-all clause arguably must be "quali-
fied in some way" to avoid "wholesale repeal" of will formalities).
1, UPC § 6-101(a). The 1989 UPC revisions add several new categories of enumer-
ated arrangements (notably, certificated and uncertificated securities, individual retire-
ment plans and marital property agreements) and revise the catch-all clause to read as
quoted in the text.
36 The statute does not expressly require that the written instrument be signed by
the person who owns the underlying property or furnishes consideration for the transfer.
See, e.g., Union Nat'l Bank of Texas v. Ornelas-Gutierrez, 772 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Tex.
1991) (upholding POD provision in written brokerage-custodial agreement not signed by
beneficial owner). In addition, the effect of the statute remains unclear in the case of a
written agreement that provides for revocation or amendment by a method other than a
signed writing. The official comment merely notes that the statute "does not speak to the
phenomenon of the oral trust to hold property at death for named persons." Id. cmt.
11 UPC § 6-101(a). The 1989 revisions add a clause permitting the separate writing
to be executed before the written instrument, The statute still does not expressly require
execution in the case of a provision for automatic cancellation of an obligation to pay
money.
11 See UPC § 6-101(a). The UPC defines a "beneficiary designation" by reference to
a "governing instrument" that names a "beneficiary" of an insurance or annuity policy,
POD account, security registered in TOD form, employee benefit plan "or other nonpro-
bate transfer at death." Id. § 1-201(4); see also id. §§ 1-201(3) ("beneficiary"), 1-201(19)
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The official comment describes the validating statute as
"authoriz[ing] a variety of contractual arrangements that had
sometimes been treated as testamentary in prior law." The offi-
cial comment cites as examples a promissory note providing for
payment to a third party in the event of the original payee's
death and an installment sale contract providing for cancellation
of any principal balance outstanding at the seller's death.38 The
arrangements described in the official comment, however, are es-
sentially non-ambulatory: the timing of payments and the iden-
tity of the recipient may be contingent on external circum-
stances, but the original payee or seller normally lacks the
ability to amend or revoke the arrangement unilaterally. Thus,
the validating statute merely reinforces the weight of judicial au-
thority upholding such arrangements.39
In its original form, the validating statute applied to provi-
sions for deathtime payments or transfers in enumerated catego-
ries of arrangements or in "any other written instrument effec-
tive as a contract, gift, conveyance, or trust."'4 The ambiguities
inherent in this catch-all clause became apparent in two cases
involving conveyances of land with possession postponed until
the grantor's death. In First National Bank in Minot v. Bloom'1
an uncle executed a deed of land to his nephew and kept the
deed in his safe deposit box where it was found after the uncle's
death in an envelope with typed instructions for delivery "upon
my death" to the nephew. The court held without hesitation
that the deed was invalid for lack of delivery and that the stat-
("governing instrument").
I UPC § 1-201 cmt.
39 See In re Estate of Hillowitz, 22 N.Y.2d 107, 238 N.E.2d 723, 291 N.YS.2d 325
(1968) (upholding provision in partnership agreement for deathtime payment in liquida-
tion of deceased partner's interest). Hillowitz limited the notorious holding of McCarthy
v. Pieret, 281 N.Y. 407, 24 N.E.2d 102 (1939) (invalidating a POD provision in a mort-
gage bond) to its facts. Courts frequently uphold self-canceling provisions in an original
installment note representing sale proceeds. See, e.g., Valenzuela v. Anchonda, 527 P.2d
109 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974); Miller v. Allen, 90 N.E.2d 251 (IlL App. Ct. 1950); McGrath v.
McGrath, 220 A.2d 760 (N.H. 1966); In re Estate of Lewis, 98 P.2d 654 (Wash. 1940);
Hunt v. Dallmeyer, 517 S.W.2d 720 (Mo. CL App. 1974). For a decision invalidating a
self-canceling note in unusual circumstances, however, see Jennings v. Neville, 54 N.E.
202 (Mll. 1899) (father sold land to son, took back son's note to be held in escrow until
father's death and cancelled if son paid pecuniary bequests).
,9 UPC § 6-201(a) (pre-1989). The 1989 UPC revisions amend the catch-all clause.
The current version is quoted in the text accompanying note 30 supra.
41 264 N.W.2d 208 (N.D. 1978).
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ute validating any "written instrument effective as a... convey-
ance" did not apply.4
2
By contrast, in Estate of O'Brien v. Robinson43 a majority of
another court took a different view. In O'Brien a mother exe-
cuted two deeds of land to her daughter. The deeds were kept in
a safe deposit box accessible to both mother and daughter until
some seven months before the mother's death when the safe de-
posit box was closed and the daughter took possession of the
deeds. The mother, however, retained possession and control of
the land until death. To avoid the "terribly illogical" result that
would flow from insisting on "strict compliance with a fictional
legal delivery requirement," a divided court concluded that the
deeds were effective, holding "(1) that when it is determined
that the proved intent of the grantor was to pass title upon his
or her death, the legal requirement of 'delivery' is satisfied, and
(2) that [the validating statute] removes the conveyance from
the requirements of the [will statute]. 44
Under a narrow reading, the O'Brien holding may reflect a
finding that the mother's continuing possession and enjoyment
of the land amounted to a retained life estate. Since she exe-
cuted deeds in proper form and relinquished physical control of
them before death, the majority may have concluded that the
conveyances should be sustained under a liberal view of the de-
livery requirement. 4' The holding might be read more broadly to
mean that the majority would have upheld the conveyances even
if the mother had retained either a power of revocation 40 or
physical control over the executed deeds until her death."
Under the broader reading, a grantor might be able to dispose of
42 "There is nothing in [the validating statute] ... which eliminates the necessity of
delivery of a deed to effectuate a conveyance from one living person to another." Id. at
212.
41 749 P.2d 154 (Wash. 1988), rev'g In re Estate of O'Brien, 733 P.2d 235 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1987).
44 749 P.2d at 157-58.
41 See id. at 157 ("If proof of delivery of these deeds had been made, the facts here
would indicate a valid inter vivos passage of a future interest with the grantor retaining a
lifetime interest.").
46 Since the mother neither expressly reserved nor attempted to exercise a power to
revoke the deed, it is impossible to know whether she intended to retain such a power.
47 Since the mother did not retain possession of the deeds until death, it is impossi-
ble to know whether the O'Brien majority would have gone so far. The majority did not
cite Bloom or bother to distinguish that case on its facts.
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a specific parcel of land at death by a deed in recordable form,
without regard to will formalities.
Under any reading, the O'Brien holding points up a serious
ambiguity in the validating statute. As the dissenters observed,
the majority's conclusion that the delivery requirement was met
(based on the mother's intent to transfer the land at death)
should have obviated the need to resort to the validating stat-
ute.48 On the other hand, as the majority pointed out, the vali-
dating statute would be superfluous if it applied only to transac-
tions that were independently effective as conveyances. 49 The
fundamental problem is that the catch-all clause does not define
its own scope with any precision.50 Indeed, it cannot do so if it is
to remain sufficiently flexible to embrace new and evolving will
substitutes.51 Although the UPC official comment expressly ap-
48 O'Brien, 749 P.2d at 158-59.
9 If an instrument were effective as a conveyance it, by definition, would have
passed a present title during the decedents lifetime. Therefore, there would be
no need to validate the instrument as nontestamentary... Stated differently,
the [validating statute] cannot operate upon a conveyance which is effective as
a conveyance because its operation as a conveyance would in and of itself make
it nontestamentary.
Id. at 157.
Unfortunately, the dissenters' reading of the validating statute is no more helpful.
They argued that the statute was "intended to validate an instrument against testamen-
tary attack only where the instrument has been made in the manner usual to the type of
transaction involved"--a requirement arguably met in O'Brien, since each deed was exe-
cuted in proper form and absolute on its face-and that "[ifn the context of a convey-
ance of an interest in land at death, [the statute] added nothing to existing ... law." Id.
at 159 (Dore, J., dissenting). In arguing that the deeds failed "because they were unde-
livered and had no independent legal effect" and not "because they did not comply with
the requirements of the statute of wills," the dissenters failed to identify any transaction
that would fall within the catch-all clause of the validating statute. Id. (emphasis in
original).
5' In response to the concern that the broad scope of the validating provision might
lead to "wholesale repeal" of will formalities, Professor Wellman proposes that the
catch-all clause be interpreted (consistently with the enumerated arrangements) to cover
only arrangements that "involve at least two persons, each of whom has selfish interests
that are served by entering into the transaction with the other." Wellman, supra note 11,
at 809 n.58. From a functional point of view, this may be a relevant consideration, but it
represents a material modification of the current provision.
A related question is whether the original UPC's validating provision by itself would
be adequate to validate a TOD direction in the registration of a security. See id. at 807-
19 (discussing possible arguments in favor); Amado, supra note 32, at 411 (assuming no
validation).
"I See Langbein, supra note 1, at 1133 (catch-all clause reaches "whatever future
products of financial intermediation may emerge").
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proves Bloom and disapproves O'Brien,52 it fails to identify any
additional transactions that the revised statute is intended to
validate.
By contrast, the UPC provisions concerning multiple-person
accounts and TOD security registration define their scope and
operation relatively clearly. The multiple-person account provi-
sions apply to all accounts in financial institutions, 3 and specifi-
cally authorize deathtime transfers of accounts to surviving par-
ties or POD beneficiaries. 4  The UPC classifies any
account-whether preexisting or newly created-as "either a
single-party account or a multiple-party account, with or with-
out right of survivorship, and with or without a POD designa-
tion or an agency designation," and defines the rights of parties,
POD beneficiaries and agents accordingly.5 5 To clarify the terms
of accounts and avoid litigation, 6 the UPC provides optional
52 The official comment states that the O'Brien court "read [the catch-all clause] to
relieve against the delivery requirement of the law of deeds, a result that was not in-
tended," and that "[tihe point was correctly decided in [Bloom]." UPC § 6-101 cmt. As
Professor McGovern observes, it is unclear why the UPC drafters considered delivery to
be more important than other will formalities. See William M. McGovern, Jr., Nonpro-
bate Transfers Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REv. 1329, 1338
(1992).
13 See UPC §§ 6-201(1) ("account"), 6-201(4) ("financial institution"). The UPC
drafters concede that the "distinction between bank accounts and securities has begun to
crumble" as banks offer large-denomination certificates of deposit and brokerage houses
offer cash management accounts subject to small recurrent transactions. Id., art. 6 prefa-
tory note. For an informative discussion of the revised UPC provisions concerning multi-
ple-person accounts and TOD security registration, see McGovern, supra note 52, at
1329-53.
A special validating statute declares that any deathtime transfer of an account to
surviving parties or POD beneficiaries is "effective by reason of the terms of the account
involved and [the multiple-person account provisions] and is not testamentary." UPC
§ 6-214.
55 UPC § 6-203(b). If the statute forcibly rearranges beneficial rights in a preexist-
ing account, its constitutionality may be called into question. On the other hand, if the
statute simply reclassifies the account to reflect the beneficial rights intended by the
parties, any constitutional challenge should be rejected. Compare Whirlpool Corp. v. Rit-
ter, 929 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding revocation-by-divorce statute unconstitu-
tional) with Kindleberger v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank of Washington, 155 F.2d 281, 285 (D.C.
Cir. 1946) (upholding application of statute implying substitute disposition to deceased
beneficiary's successors). See Edward C. Halbach, Jr. & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The
UPC's New Survivorship and Antilapse Provisions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1091, 1128-30 (1992)
(criticizing Ritter).
" See, e.g., Corning Bank v. Rice, 645 S.W.2d 675 (Ark. 1983) (suit against bank by
disappointed POD beneficiary); Robinson v. Colebrook Guar. Say. Bank, 254 A.2d 837
(N.H. 1968) (same). "A major goal of the 1989 revision is to encourage financial institu-
tions to use the statutory forms and abandon their practice of routinely offering joint
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statutory forms which (at least with respect to accounts with
provisions "substantially" in the prescribed form) conclusively
define the beneficial interests of surviving parties and POD ben-
eficiaries at the death of a party."7 In establishing a mechanical
rule governing ownership of accounts at the death of a party,
and decoupling that rule from the more flexible presumption
governing ownership during life,"" the UPC moves away from
the troublesome joint account form and encourages financial in-
stitutions to offer accounts conforming to the statutory pattern.
Problems may arise in determining the rights of surviving
parties when the UPC reclassifies a nonconforming account to fit
the statutory pattern.59 In the case of a traditional joint account,
the intent of the parties can generally be accommodated by sim-
ply relabeling the arrangement either as a multiple-party ac-
count with or without a right of survivorship or as a mere agency
account.60 But the statute may frustrate the parties' intent in
other cases. For example, the UPC automatically reclassifies ex-
accounts to customers who merely wish to add another person's name to an account for
agency, death beneficiary, or multiple-owners-with-no-survivorship purposes." L*,wRmc
W. WAGGONER ET AL. FAMILY PROPERTY LAw 408 (1991). The UPC offers financial institu-
tions protection as an incentive to cooperate in offering the statutory forms. See UPC
§ 6-226.
7 The statutorily-prescribed forms determine the presence or absence of survivor-
ship rights among parties, as well as the effect of a POD designation, in an account with
conforming provisions, regardless of evidence of the parties' contrary intent. Even if evi-
dence of mistake cannot defeat the rights of a named surviving party or POD benefi-
ciary, however, evidence of incapacity, fraud or undue influence should be admissible.
See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 56, at 407 (evidence of incapacity, fraud or undue
influence admissible to defeat POD beneficiary's claim under original UPC).
"In the case of a multiple-party account, parties are presumed to own the account
in proportion to their respective net contributions, in the absence of "clear and convinc-
ing evidence of a different intent." See UPC §§ 6-204(a) (forms), 6-211(b) (lifetime own-
ership), 6-212 (deathtime ownership). This conceptually elegant mechanism for deter-
mining lifetime rights permits the parties "to be as definite, or as indefinite, as they
wish" in apportioning lifetime ownership, see id. § 6-211 cmt., but may prove difficult to
apply if it requires tracing of contributions and withdrawals. See Zartman, supra note 2,
at 461.
" The UPC defines beneficial rights in accounts that are not substantially in the
prescribed statutory form by reference to "the type of account that moast nearly conforms
to the depositor's intent" UPC § 6-204(b).
1o The statute does not specify an evidentiary standard for determining the parties'
intent. Perhaps a joint tenant's presumed survivorship right will fail if a preponderance
of the evidence indicates that the parties intended to create an agency account or a mul-
tiple-party account without survivorship rights. See WAGGONER Lr AL, supra note 56, at
408 n.6. This would be inconsistent, however, with the clear-and-convincing standard
specified in the original UPC. See UPC § 6-104(a) (pre-1989).
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isting "trust accounts" as accounts with POD designations, ap-
parently precluding the trustee's successors from contesting the
beneficiary's ownership rights at the trustee's death.61 The terms
of an account agreement may even conflict with the dispositive
patterns permitted by the statute. If the parties clearly intend to
create a tenancy-in-common account with a separate POD bene-
ficiary for each party's deathtime share of the account, the POD
designation may simply fail, leaving a multiple-party account
with no right of survivorship. 2 Or perhaps the evidence will
show that the parties would have preferred to sever their respec-
tive interests in order to sustain separate POD designations.03
The POD beneficiary, however, may argue that the original ar-
rangement should be upheld according to its terms under the
blanket validating provision. 4 A saving clause permitting the
parties to show nonconforming ownership for preexisting ac-
counts might alleviate these problems.
The provisions for TOD security registration permit an
owner to register a security in "beneficiary form" under an
agreement with a "registering entity," and specifically authorize
a deathtime transfer of the security to the owner's designated
beneficiary. 5 The operative TOD provisions are closely modeled
on the POD account provisions and provide statutory forms il-
o, See UPC § 6-201(8) (definition of POD account). The statute also precludes the
beneficiaries from showing that they were intended to take the account with rights of
survivorship among themselves. Compare UPC § 6-212(b)(2) (conclusive rights of sur-
viving beneficiaries, with no survivorship rights) with UPC § 6-104(c)(2) (pre-1989) (ac-
count belongs to surviving beneficiaries at trustee's death unless clear evidence of con-
trary intent; no survivorship rights among beneficiaries unless expressly provided by
account or agreement).
"2 See UPC § 6-212(c) (POD designation in multiple-party account without right of
survivorship is "ineffective").
0 In the analogous case where multiple owners of a security attempt to register the
security in beneficiary form, the UPC requires a right of survivorship among the owners.
See UPC § 6-302. This provision could be read to impose a right of survivorship even if
the owners would have preferred.to eliminate the registration in beneficiary form in or-
der to preserve their rights as tenants-in-common.
Compare UPC § 6-101 (validating "deposit agreement" providing for deathtime
payments) with id. § 6-204(b) (nonconforming accounts governed by §§ 6-201 to -227).
11 See UPC § 6-301 (defining terms). "A transfer on death resulting from a registra-
tion in beneficiary form is effective by reason of the 'contract regarding the registration
between the owner and the registering entity and [the TOD provisions] and is not testa-
mentary." Id. § 6-309(a). The statute also attempts to validate a TOD registration that
was made without express statutory authorization, by reciting that such a registration is
"presumed to be valid and authorized as a matter of contract law." Id. § 6-303. On TOD
security registration generally, see Wellman, supra note 11.
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lustrating registration in beneficiary form.6 The statute also au-
thorizes each registering entity to establish its own "terms and
conditions" for accepting and implementing registrations in ben-
eficiary form. 7 By permitting registering entities maximum flex-
ibility in adopting TOD registration, the UPC drafters hope to
encourage the spontaneous use of a simple, straightforward form
of nonprobate transfer to replace less reliable will substitutes
such as joint-and-survivor registration.68
C. Refining the UPC Standard
The UPC provisions concerning multiple-person accounts
and TOD security registration offer a useful starting point for
refining the blanket validating statute.69 Initially, as a technical
matter, the statute should affirmatively authorize nonprobate
transfers instead of merely labeling them "nontestamentary."
For example, the statute might declare that a provision in a gov-
erning instrument or separate written beneficiary designation for
a nonprobate transfer at death of property, rights or benefits is
"effective in accordance with its terms," as long as certain mini-
mum formalities are met.70 The statute should also provide that
" The TOD provisions address the rights of multiple owners of a security only at
the death of the last surviving owner, perhaps because traditional concepts of co-owner-
ship are more readily adaptable to securities than to the fluctuating balance of an ac-
count in a financial institution. The elements of a common-law joint tenancy may ex-
plain why the owners of a security registered in beneficiary form-unlike the parties to a
multiple-party account-must be individuals. See UPC §§ 6-302 (TOD registration), 6-
201 (definition of "party"). The POD account rules concerning lifetime ownership may
be appropriate, however, for some securities such as mutual fund accounts. The 1989
revisions extend the blanket validating statute to cover certificated and uncertificated
securities. See id. § 6-101(a).
67 See id. § 6-310.
68 See McGovern, supra note 52, at 1350-51; Welman, 6upra note 11, at 794; see
also Milliken v. First Nat'1 Bank, 290 A.2d 889 (Me. 1972) (stock certificates providing
"[A] & on his decease [B] if she survives him is the owner" not effective to create joint
tenancy;, no discussion of alternative theory).
" The Missouri nonprobate transfers law, enacted in 1989, develops the basic struc-
ture of the UPC's TOD provisions for application to a broad range of nonprobate trans-
fers. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 461.003-.081 (1986 & Supp. 1992). The Mis.ouri law provides
numerous points of comparison with the UPC, especially in the areas of validation, con-
struction and creditors' rights.
70 Cf. UPC §§ 6-214, 6-309(a). Interestingly, an early draft of the validating statute
followed this approach. See Frather, supra note 2, at 1084 & n.225 (draft statute declar-
ing that a provision "in a written contract" for deathtime payments to a designated ben-
eficiary "is effective in accordance with its terms").
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a nonprobate transfer is effective at death without regard to will
formalities or probate administration.71 By authorizing nonpro-
bate transfers at death without relying on the common-law dis-
tinction between testamentary and nontestamentary transfers,
the statute would sidestep much of the doctrinal confusion that
plagues conventional will substitutes.
As a structural matter, it is crucial to define the transac-
tions that the statute validates. In confirming the validity of
conventional will substitutes in the form of contracts, trusts and
lifetime transfers, the statute does neither much harm nor much
good. On the other hand, to the extent that it validates new
methods of transferring property at death, the statute raises im-
portant questions concerning the form and function of will
substitutes.
Multiple-person accounts and securities registered in TOD
form represent new types of nonprobate transfers which remain
ambulatory during life and expressly become effective only at
death. These transfers relate to specific property (an account or
security) which remains readily identifiable at all times despite
fluctuations in the balance or number of units during the
owner's life. Moreover, they are administered by an institutional
third-party "payor"72 who has a strong incentive to implement
transfers promptly and efficiently. Finally, a governing instru-
ment (generally in the form of an agreement between the payor
and the owner of the underlying property) sets forth the essen-
tial dispositive and administrative terms of the transfer.73
Conceivably, the blanket validating statute could be ex-
panded to authorize any sort of written agreement between an
owner and a payor for the nonprobate transfer of property at
death.74 A simple example, however, reveals the potential
71 Cf. UPC §§ 6-214 (multiple-person accounts), 6-309 (TOD registration). To the
extent that nonprobate transfers are includible in the augmented estate or available to
satisfy statutory allowances or claims, the statute should specifically so state. See infra
Parts III.B & III.C.
11 The term "payor" as used in the UPC includes the person authorized or obligated
to make payments or transfer property under most will substitutes. See UPC § 1-
201(34) ("payor" includes trustee, insurer or other person authorized or obligated by law
or governing instrument to make payments).
11 See UPC § 6-308(b) (registering entity that accepts request for TOD registration
agrees to implement deathtime transfer).
74 See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 461.012 (agreement between owner and payor for
nonprobate transfer), 461.014 (acceptance of agreement), 461.021 (authorizing nonpro-
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problems with such a broad statute. Assume that A (a payor)
and B (an owner) enter into an agreement (evidenced by a writ-
ten instrument and supported by consideration, but not comply-
ing with will formalities) which provides that at B's death A
shall take possession of all B's property and distribute it in ac-
cordance with B's written directions. Despite some authority for
determining the validity of a contractual arrangement without
regard to its probate-avoidance function, 5 the arrangement
probably would not be upheld as a contract,70 donative trans-
fer,7 trust7 8 or power of appointment.70  Because the arrange-
bate transfer of property by beneficiary designation in written instrument) (1936 &
Supp. 1992).
7 See Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 125 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1942) (upholding
revocable beneficiary designation for deathtime payment under contract with life insur-
ance company); Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Rainey, 182 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1944) (same).
Professor Browder makes the argument forcefully:.
Any inclination a court may have toward condemning contracts as testamen-
tary dispositions of property should be summarily suppresed. The only issue
that really exists when enforcement of a promise is sought is governed by the
law of contract-that is, whether under that law the promise is valid and bind-
ing. There should be no reason to question any contract on the ground that it
is a substitute for a will, for, if it is, there is no law against it.
Browder, supra note 11, at 875; see also Scorr, supra note 13, § 56.5A, at 111-19.
71 See, e.g., Halldin v. Usher, 321 P.2d 746 (Cal. 1958) (written agreement between
spouses disposing of specific property at survivor's death); Jennings v. Neville, 54 Na.E
202 (IMI. 1899) (father sold land to son, took back son's note; written agreement provided
for cancellation of note at father's death conditioned on son's payment of specified lega-
cies under father's existing will); Lucas v. Smith, 383 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1964) ('partner-
ship agreement" between owner and housekeeper providing for transfer of property at
owner's death); Neylon v. Parker, 128 N.W.2d 690 (Neb. 1964) (reciprocal deeds reflect-
ing oral agreement between sisters disposing of real and personal property owned at
death); Spinks v. Rice, 47 S.E.2d 424 (Va. 1948) (written agreement between unmarried
persons disposing of all property owned at death). The agreements in these cases, how-
ever, may be distinguished from the arrangement described in text on the ground that
they restrain the owner's ability to dispose of property by wilL See Browder, supra note
11, at 858-59 (commenting on Spinks case).
In In re Estate of Langley, 546 N.E.2d 1287 (Ind. CL App. 1989), the court held that
"a safe deposit box lease agreement that specifically provides for joint ownership of and
survivorship rights in the contents is sufficient to serve as a contract between the parties
to establish survivorship rights in a co-tenant." Id. at 1290. The court expressly refused
to invoke the blanket validating statute, and based its holding exclusively on general
principles of contract and property law. See id. at 1289 n.2.
77See, e.g., Goins v. Melton, 121 S.W.2d 821 (Mo. 1938) (deed of any portion of
specific real property unsold at grantor's death and all personal property); Neylon v.
Parker, 128 N.W.2d 690 (Neb. 1964) (reciprocal deeds disposing of sisters' real and per-
sonal property owned at death); Butler v. Sherwood, 196 A.D. 603, 188 N.Y.S. 242 (1921)
(wife's revocable deed of all real and personal property to husband, to take effect at
death if husband then living); cf. RESTATEMEM (SEcoND) OF Po0PEm- (Donative Trans-
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ment has no purpose or effect other than probate avoidance and
because it raises substantial dangers of fraud and mistake with
no corresponding safeguards, the arrangement should also fall
outside the scope of the blanket validating statute.8
When an institutional third-party payor administers a non-
probate transfer, the statute should leave the terms of the trans-
fer (including formalities for making and changing beneficiary
designations) to agreement between the owner and payor.8 1 A
statute that imposes unnecessary or burdensome formalities un-
dermines the practical advantages of nonprobate transfers.82
fers) §§ 32.1 (inter vivos donative document of transfer must be legally operative while
donor is alive), 32.4 (inter vivos donative document of transfer may be valid will substi-
tute despite donor's retained beneficial enjoyment and power to revoke), 32.4 cmt. a (will
substitute executed immediately before death might dispose of donor's remaining prop-
erty, leaving no property to pass at death by will or intestacy) (1990).
78 In the absence of identifiable trust property or a manifested intent to create a
present fiduciary relationship, no express trust is created. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS §§ 23, 26, 74, 76 (1957). The blanket validating statute, however, raises a related
problem in. the context of a pourover trust. The UPC validates a devise to an unfunded
trust created at the testator's death "if the trust is identified in the testator's will and its
terms are set forth in a written instrument, other than a will...." UPC § 2-511(a). The
property so devised, though normally subject to administration, "is not held under a
testamentary trust of the testator." Id. § 2-511(b). It remains unclear whether the blan-
ket validating statute may permit an owner to declare a trust that expressly comes into
existence at death and removes the underlying property from the probate system.
7 See, e.g., Dawson v. Dawson's Administratrix, 272 S.W.2d 666 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954)
(written memorandum designating beneficiaries of fixed sum of money if owned at
death). The official comment to the original UPC validating statute noted the "analogy
of the power of appointment" as an alternative approach to contractual arrangements
providing for payments or transfers at death. UPC § 6-201 cmt. (pre-1989). In the 1989
revisions, however, this portion of the official comment was deleted. See UPC § 6-101
cmt.; see also Browder, supra note 11, at 875 (suggesting UPC validating statute should
not apply to inter vivos transfers completed by informal writing, "[o]therwise a new
method will have been created for conveying land without satisfying either the require-
ments for wills or for inter vivos conveyances").
80 See Hibbler v. Knight, 735 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) ("the legislature
did not intend for [the blanket validating statute] to validate agreements allowing testa-
mentary disposition of a person's entire estate, including real property, without the re-
quirements of a will or the formalities of will execution"); Wellman, supra note 11, at
809 n.58 (arrangement described in text not within intended scope of blanket validating
statute).
"I Thus, a payor should be able to impose additional formalities for its own conve-
nience or protection as part of a contractual arrangement. See, e.g., UPC § 6-310(a) (reg-
istering entity may establish terms for implementing TOD registration).
82 Under the Missouri nonprobate transfers law, unless a payor adopts its own rules,
a beneficiary designation must be made "in writing, subscribed by the owner or owners,
dated, witnessed by at least one person who is not expressly named a beneficiary in the
designation and be delivered to the [payor] or [its authorized agent]." Mo. REV. STAT,
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The present requirement of a written instrument probably rep-
resents an irreducible minimum level of formality.83
On the other hand, specific alternative formalities may
prove useful when no third-party payor is involved, as in the
case of real property. The UPC drafters might consider author-
izing a form of deed that would transfer real property at the
owner's death, relying on the recording system as a substitute
for probate formalities. Under such a statute, an owner would be
able to execute and record a deed which expressly conveys real
property at death and has no effect on legal ownership or control
during the owner's life."" Mechanically, such a deathtime trans-
fer is just as simple as a conventional joint tenancy or a lifetime
conveyance with retained life estate. It also raises no greater
danger of fraud or mistake than any other beneficiary designa-
tion. To preserve the integrity of the recording system, however,
the owner should be required to comply with the recording for-
malities in exercising any retained power of appointment under
a recorded deed. 5
§ 461.062(1) (1986 & Supp. 1992). If a beneficiary designation may fail due to a mis-
placed signature, an equivocally abbreviated date or an acknowledgment by a benefi-
ciary, the owner might find it less troublesome to execute a will.
83 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Donative Transfers) § 32.1 (1990) (inter
vivos donative document of transfer is a writing or writing equivalent, signed by the
donor or identified as coming from the donor, that identifies the donor and donee, de-
scribes the subject matter of the gift, specifies the nature of the transferred interest, and
manifests the donor's intention that the document be legally operative while the donor is
alive).
Surprisingly, although the UPC requires a signed writing to modify the type of an
existing account, see UPC § 6-213(a), it does not expressly require a signature or a writ-
ing to create a multiple-person account. As a result, oral instructions may be sufficient to
create survivorship rights but ineffective to revoke them. See, e.g., Estate of Wolfinger v.
Wolfinger, 793 P.2d 393 (Utah 1990). In the case of a TOD registration of an uncertifi-
cated security, the written instrument may consist simply of an account reflecting regis-
tration in beneficiary form. See UPC §§ 6-301 (definitions), 6-304 (TOD registration of
uncertificated security evidenced by account).
84 See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 461.025(1) (1986 & Supp. 1992) (authorizing deed of
real property "that expressly states that the deed is not to take effect until the death of
the grantor," if executed and recorded before grantor's death). As a practical matter, the
Missouri nonprobate transfers law might not affect the result in many cases striking
down deeds as testamentary. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Rines, 375 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1964) (ex-
pressly ambulatory deed physically delivered to the grantee but not recorded before the
grantor's death); First Nat'l Bank in Minot v. Bloom, 264 N.W.2d 208 (N.D. 1978) (deed
not recorded before grantor's death); Estate of O'Brien v. Robinson, 749 P.2d 154, 156
(Wash. 1988) (deed recorded before grantor's death did not expressly state that it was
not to take effect until grantor's death).
For example, assume that A executes and records a deed of real property that
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The blanket validating statute gives effect to an attempted
deathtime disposition that might otherwise fail due to noncom-
pliance with will formalities. The statute has no effect on a will
substitute that falls outside its ambit. Nor does it directly mod-
ify the formalities prescribed for wills under the probate code.
Thus, the dispositive effect of a will substitute that is not cov-
ered by a validating statute-for example, an oral trust agree-
ment or an undelivered deed of land-must be determined
under the passing-of-an-interest test or some other common-law
standard.86 But what if an instrument intended as a will substi-
tute-also happens to comply with the will formalities?
To illustrate the problem, assume that A executes two in-
struments in the form of attested deeds of separate parcels of
land. One instrument expressly states that it is not to take effect
or pass any interest until A's death. In the absence of a validat-
ing statute, this instrument may be ineffective as a lifetime con-
veyance but may still be admitted to probate if it complies with
applicable will formalities. 87 By contrast, the second instrument
recites an absolute present conveyance but remains undelivered
at A's death. This instrument may fail both as a lifetime convey-
ance and as a will (notwithstanding compliance with the will for-
malities), if extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to show testamen-
tary intent in the probate proceeding.8 Should a validating
names B as grantee and states that the deed is not to take effect until A's death, as
provided in the Missouri nonprobate transfers law. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 461.025(1)
(1986 & Supp. 1992). Should the conveyance fail if the deed also reserves to A a power of
revocation or amendment exercisable at any time by an instrument signed by A? If the
deed refers to a separate written beneficiary designation executed or to be executed by
A? If the deed designates a beneficiary by reference to events of independent significance
existing at A's death? If the specific provision for conveyances of real property does not
apply, may the conveyance nevertheless be saved under the blanket validating statute?
See UPC § 6-101(a); Wagner, supra note 11, at 1204.
See UPC § 6-101 cmt.
87 See In re Wnuk's Will, 41 N.W.2d 294 (Wis. 1950) (deed, undelivered during life,
admissible to probate although it was expressly "null and void until after [grantor's]
death"). Of course, the instrument might be interpreted as a valid lifetime conveyance,
obviating the need to offer it as a will. See Vigil v. Sandoval, 741 P.2d 836 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1987).
88 See Noble v. Tipton, 76 N.E. 151 (Ill. 1905) (deed absolute in form invalid for
lack of delivery); Noble v. Fickes, 82 N.E. 950 (Ill. 1907) (same instrument not admissi-
ble to probate, extrinsic evidence inadmissible to show testamentary intent). In the latter
case, the court observed: "It would be a strange result if the same evidence which de-
stroyed the instrument as a deed should bring it to life as a will." 82 N.E. at 954. To the
dissenters, it seemed even stranger to defeat the intended disposition both as a deed and
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statute produce a different result in either case, assuming the
instrument falls within its ambit?
If the instrument is admissible to probate, A's intended dis-
position can be given effect regardless of whether the instrument
is treated as a will or a will substitute;89 the principal conse-
quence of applying the validating statute is to remove the land
from A's probate estate.90 The validating statute, however,
should not apply to an instrument that is admissible to probate
as a will.9' If the instrument is not admissible to probate, a
strong argument can be made for applying the validating statute
in order to prevent the intended disposition from being com-
pletely frustrated.92 Since the validating statute does not clearly
distinguish a failed will from a valid will substitute, a court in-
clined to avoid intestacy might well invoke the statute to vali-
date a formally defective will.9 3 In any event, the statute should
not apply to a disposition that is tainted by fraud, undue influ-
ence or a similar substantive defect.04
as a will, in the former case by admitting extrinsic evidence of testamentary intent and
in the latter case by excluding the same evidence.
8" The 1990 UPC revisions extend several constructional rules to apply to nonpro-
bate transfers as well as wills. See infra Part II.
" Under the UPC, the land would be included in the grantor's augmented estate for
purposes of determining the surviving spouse's elective share. See UPC § 2-202(b)(2).
However, it would not necessarily be available to pay statutory allowances or creditors'
claims. See infra Part IILC.
91 The official comment states that "[t]he sole purpose of this section is to prevent
the transfers authorized here from being treated as testamentary." UPC § 6-101 cmt.
(emphasis added). The validating statute authorizes "nonprobate" transfers. An instru-
ment that complies with statutory formalities and is admissible to probate is valid with-
out regard to the validating statute, and it would be absurd to reclassify a %ill as "non-
testamentary." The Missouri nonprobate transfers law makes this explicit by defining
nonprobate transfers and beneficiary designations in terms of "a writing that is not a
will." Mo. Rav. STAT. §§ 461.005(2), .005(5) (1986 & Supp. 1992). Of course, if an instru-
ment intended as a will is not offered for probate, or is not admitted because of a techni-
cal defect, it remains unclear whether the intended disposition can or should be vali-
dated as a nonprobate transfer.
92 On the facts of a particular case, the grantors testate or intestate successor might
coincidentally be the same person as the intended grantee under the instrument. In such
a case, the validating statute would not affect the disposition of the land, but would still
affect the classification of the land as a probate or nonprobate asset.
11 On the other hand, the court may refuse to apply the validating statute on the
ground that a defective will is not a "conveyance, deed of git... or other written instru-
ment of a similar nature." See UPC § 6-101(a).
, Curiously, when a beneficiary is disqualified from taking a nonprobate transfer
due to fraud, duress, undue influence or homicide, the Missouri nonprobate transfers law
does not simply invalidate the tainted disposition but provides a mandatory substitute
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It may seem anomalous that the applicability of the validat-
ing statute-and thus the removal of the underlying property
from the probate estate-should depend on whether an equivo-
cal instrument happens to be admissible to probate. As a practi-
cal matter, the "dispensing power" introduced in the 1990 UPC
revisions greatly reduces the risk that a purely formal defect will
prevent an instrument intended as a will from being admitted to
probate.9 5 Indeed, the UPC's dispensing power may signal a con-
vergence of formalities for wills and will substitutes e Neverthe-
less, a workable distinction between probate and nonprobate
transfers remains important for the efficient implementation of
both types of transfers.
Consider the situation where an owner designates A as ben-
eficiary of a nonprobate transfer of property at death and later
executes a valid will specifically devising the same property to B.
In the absence of an applicable statute, the result depends in the
first instance on whether the governing instrument for the non-
probate transfer expressly permits or prohibits amendment or
revocation of a beneficiary designation by will. If the governing
instrument is silent, the result may depend on the type of will
substitute. In the reverse situation, where the owner designates
disposition in favor of the owner's surviving spouse and children, if any. See Mo. REV.
STAT. § 461.054 (1986 & Supp. 1992) (nonprobate assets).
" See UPC § 2-503 (dispensing power).
9 On will formalities generally, see Gaubatz, supra note 25; John H. Langbein, Sub-
stantial Compliance With the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1975); John H. Langbein,
Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia's Tranquil
Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1987); James Lindgren, Abolishing the
Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541 (1990); C. Douglas Miller, Will
Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislation Reform: An Examination of the New
Uniform Probate Code "Harmless Error" Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism,
Parts I & II, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167, 599 (1991).
"' In the case of a tentative savings account trust, courts generally imply a power to
revoke by will. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 crat. c (1957); see, e.g., Jones
v. First Nat'l Bank, 234 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977); In re Estate of Stein, 42 Misc.
2d 787, 249 N.Y.S.2d 223 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1964); In re Estate of Bol, 429 N.W.2d 467
(S.D. 1988). By contrast, courts generally permit a settlor to revoke an express trust by
will only if the terms of the trust so provide. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 330 cmt. j (1957); id. § 331 cmt. d; see, e.g., In re Estate of Stein, 42 Misc. 2d 787, 249
N.Y.S.2d 223 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1964) (revocable trust of mutual funds; no revocation by
will); In re Estate of Kovalyshyn,.343 A.2d 852 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975) (same); Estate of
Lowry, 418 N.E.2d 10 (Ill. App, Ct. 1981) (revocation by will permitted under terms of
trust).
The owner of a life insurance policy may generally revoke or amend a beneficiary
designation by will, unless the policy prescribes a different method; most policies do. See
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A as beneficiary after executing the will in B's favor, the analysis
is slightly different. Here, the only sensible result is to treat the
nonprobate transfer as removing the underlying property from
the probate system; otherwise, the beneficiary designation has
no effect. 8
The UPC provisions concerning revocation and amendment
by will require clarification. The blanket validating statute,
which specifically applies to account agreements and securities,
expressly permits a beneficiary designation by will." By con-
trast, the UPC provisions concerning multiple-person accounts
specifically prohibit any alteration by will of the rights of a sur-
viving party or POD beneficiary.100 The TOD provisions are si-
lent, apparently leaving the matter to agreement between the
owner and registering entity.10 In the absence of material differ-
ences justifying special treatment for certain types of nonpro-
bate transfers, a uniform rule is undoubtedly desirable. Not sur-
prisingly, the content of such a rule proves controversial.
One current proposal would permit an owner to override
COUCH, supra note 14, §§ 28:5, :59-61, at 10-13, 94-99. In Wisconsin, the oner of an
insurance policy generally cannot change the beneficiary by will, but may do so by "any
act that unequivocally indicates an intention to make the change." WIs. STAT.
§ 632.48(1)(b) (1992); see Empire General Life Ins. Co. v. Silverman, 399 N.V.2d 910
(Wis. 1987) (statute does not require writing).
In the case of an employee benefit plan covered by ERISA, the beneficiary designa-
tion may control as a matter of federal law. See MacLean v. Ford Motor Co., 831 F.2d
723 (7th Cir. 1987); cf. Lyles v. Teachers Retirement Board, 33 Cal. Rptr. 328 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1963) (permitting revocation of beneficiary designation by will, by analogy to tenta-
tive trust; ERISA not applicable).
9, The UPC does not expressly permit partial revocation of a will by a subsequent
inconsistent will substitute. See UPC § 2-507 (revocation by will or physical act). Never-
theless, by analogy to a lifetime disposition of specifically devised property, a beneficiary
designation should cause an ademption of the underlying property. See id. § 2-606(a)(6)
(ademption consistent with testator's intent).
99 See UPC § 6-101(a) (owner may designate beneficiary in "separate writing, in-
cluding a will, executed either before or at the same time as the instrument, or later").
,oo UPC § 6-213(b); see Estate of Schwendeman, 251 N.E.2d 99 (I1. App. Ct. 1969)
(POD designation controls subsequent inconsistent disposition in will). On the other
hand, courts may refuse to enforce the rights of a POD beneficiary or surviving party
that conflict with a deceased party's valid, preexisting contractual will. See, eg., Foulds
v. First Nat'l Bank, 707 P.2d 1171 (N.M. 1985) (POD account); Morse v. Williams, 740
P.2d 884 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (joint bank account).
The UPC reverses the common-law rule with respect to tentative trusts and treats
them the same as POD accounts. See UPC § 6-201(8) (definition of POD account).
'0, See UPC § 6-306 cmt. (statute "says nothing about how a TOD beneficiary des-
ignation may be canceled, meaning that the registering entity's terms and conditions, if
any, may be relevant").
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beneficiary designations by an express provision in the will. 102
From the owner's perspective, this proposal offers the attractive
prospect of a convenient, centralized means of changing benefi-
ciary designations in numerous will substitutes without regard to
the formalities applicable to each particular will substitute.
From the perspective of a payor, however, the proposal threat-
ens substantial inconvenience: uncertainty concerning the exis-
tence or effect of a will,10 3 disruption of contractual terms and
administrative procedures, 10 4 and potential liability for negligent
payment to the wrong person.105
A successful system of nonprobate transfers must strike a
reasonable balance between the convenience of property owners
and the practical constraints of the payors who administer most
nonprobate transfers. To the extent that the terms of, a particu-
lar will substitute expressly permit or prohibit revocation or
amendment of a beneficiary designation by will, those terms
102 See Michael D. Carrico, Uniform "SuperWill" Legislation Project, 14 PROB. &
PROP. 45 (1986); Debra Lynch Dubovich, Note, The Blockbuster Will: Effectuating the
Testator's Intent to Change Will Substitute Beneficiaries, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 719 (1987);
Mark L. Kaufmann, Note, Should the Dead Hand Tighten Its Grasp: An Analysis of
the SuperWill, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 1019; Roberta R. Kwall & Anthony J. Aiello, The
Superwill Debate: Opening the Pandora's Box?, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 277 (1989); see also
Langbein, supra note 1, at 1138-39.
103 If a beneficiary designation is subject to revocation or amendment by will, it may
be difficult to determine whether the will sufficiently indicates an intent to override a
particular beneficiary designation. For example, a simple residuary clause by itself ordi-
narily does not control the disposition of property already subject to a valid will substi-
tute. See In re Ryan's Will, 52 N.Y.S.2d 502, 507-08 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1944); In re Poz-
zuto's Estate, 188 A. 209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1936). But cf. In re Estate of Bol, 429 N.W.2d
467 (S.D. 1988). What if the residuary clause purports to dispose of "all property not
otherwise effectively disposed of under this will and any property that would otherwise
pass at death pursuant to a nonprobate transfer"? Cf. UPC § 2-608 (exercise of power of
appointment).
'0 If a payor can no longer rely conclusively on a standard beneficiary designation
to ascertain the proper recipient of a nonprobate transfer, the transfer will unavoidably
require more time and expense. In addition, a standard contractual arrangement used in
many different jurisdictions would become subject to a patchwork of different state pro-
bate codes. Choice of law may also be far from clear. Compare Riggio v. Southwest Bank
of St. Louis, 815 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (disposition of joint and trust accounts
determined under situs law) with Morris v. Cullipher, 816 S.W.2d 878 (Ark. 1991) (dispo-
sition of joint certificates of deposit determined under domiciliary law).
105 The problem of liability might be alleviated by statutory protection for a trans-
feror or registering entity that carries out a nonprobate transfer according to its terms
and without actual written notice of objection. See UPC §§ 6-226 (multiple-person ac-
counts), 6-308 (TOD security registration). For a discussion of the UPC's payor-protec-
tion provisions, see infra Part III.A.
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should be respected.106 In the absence of an express provision,
however, a statutory presumption against amendment or revoca-
tion by will may be justified to preserve the autonomy of non-
probate transfers and avoid unnecessary entanglement with the
probate system.
II. ASCERTAINING DIsposITIvE INTENT
Most will substitutes provide for a payment of money or
transfer of specific property at the owner's death directly to as-
certained beneficiaries in fixed proportions. Indeed, it is the rou-
tine, standardized character of the typical nonprobate transfer
that enables payors to administer will substitutes promptly and
efficiently. Uncertainty concerning the disposition of nonprobate
assets tends to arise either from ambiguous expressions in the
governing instrument or from unforeseen events that intervene
between the making of a beneficiary designation and the owner's
death. Since problems of ambiguity and changed circumstances
are common to wills and will substitutes, judicial and statutory
solutions developed in interpreting wills often prove well suited
for broader application to will substitutes.107 The 1990 UPC re-
visions restructure several rules concerning the dispositive ef-
fects of wills and expand them to apply to a broad range of writ-
ten will substitutes in an attempt to "bring the law of probate
and nonprobate transfers into greater unison." 08
A. Will Substitutes and Specific Devises
The analogy between a will substitute and a specific devise
offers a useful starting point for developing integrated rules of
construction. Like a specific devise, a will substitute typically
,01 The UPC's categorical prohibition on changing the beneficiary of a POD account
by will discourages challenges to an account that conforms to the statutory pattern. At
the same time, however, it is unclear why the statute should prevent the parties from
expressly agreeing to a different arrangement. See UPC § 6-213(b) (prohibiting altera-
tion by will of survivorship rights).
107 "Both as a matter of legislative policy and as a principle of judicial construction,
we should aspire to uniformity in the subsidiary rules for probate and nonprobate trans-
fers." Langbein, supra note 1, at 1136.
108 UPC art 2 prefatory note. The revised rules generally apply to the construction
of governing instruments, and are thus not limited to wills or will substitutes. For exam-
ple, a "governing instrument" includes an irrevocable inter vivos trust agreement. See id.
§ 1-201(19) (defining "governing instrument").
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disposes of specific, identifiable property-an account or secur-
ity, or rights under a life insurance policy or pension plan. By
contrast, a will substitute rarely disposes of a fixed sum payable
from general, unidentified sources or the owner's residual prop-
erty.109 The asset-specific character of a will substitute sets the
underlying property apart from the owner's general assets,
thereby obviating the need for several rules of will construction
that allocate benefits and burdens between a specific devisee and
other beneficiaries. For example, a beneficiary designation with
respect to a particular security or account automatically adjusts
for certain changes in or additions to the underlying property. 110
Similarly, a sale or other disposition of the underlying property
normally has the same effect as ademption, although in some
cases-an inter vivos trust or security account, for example-the
will substitute may automatically extend to proceeds of the orig-
inal property."' The relation between probate and nonprobate
transfers in the context of creditors' rights becomes more com-
plicated: some will substitutes prevent a deceased owner's credi-
tors from reaching the underlying property and, in effect, shift
the burden of repayment to the probate estate.112
Most will substitutes are administered by a payor who per-
forms the ministerial function of transferring the underlying
property to designated beneficiaries at or after the owner's
death. The arrangement may be purely contractual, as in the
case of a bank account, life insurance policy or TOD registra-
tion, or the payor may technically owe fiduciary duties, as in the
case of a revocable trust declaration. 3 In comparison with a
I An inter vivos trust, of course, may receive testamentary additions of the set-
tlor's general assets, but such assets are poured over under a will only after probate and
administration. See UPC § 2-511.
10 Cf. UPC § 2-605 (devise of securities of same or related organization acquired by
distribution, reorganization or reinvestment plan).
"I Cf. UPC § 2-606 (nonademption of specific devise to extent of unpaid purchase
price, condemnation award or casualty insurance proceeds).
11' For a discussion of creditors' rights in nonprobate assets, see infra Part III.C. Cf.
UPC §§ 2-607 (specific devise presumed subject to encumbrances without right of exon-
eration), 3-902 (order of abatement with respect to probate assets).
11- See, e.g., Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. 1955) (revocable trust of mu-
tual fund shares). The standardized terms of such a trust may render the settlor-trus-
tee's basic duties of loyalty, impartiality, care and prudent investment unenforceable as
a practical matter. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 1127-28. Fiduciary obligations tend to
have more substance in the case of a trust agreement between the settlor and an institu-
tional trustee.
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personal representative, the payor performs the single, simple
function of distributing specific property to designated benefi-
ciaries. Generally, the payor is not responsible for collecting gen-
eral assets, paying creditors' claims, exercising discretion or
resolving disputes among beneficiaries. Indeed, in the event of a
dispute, the payor may simply deposit the underlying property
with a court and interplead the competing beneficiaries. By the
same token, the payor has a strong incentive to minimize dis-
putes by channelling beneficiary designations into simple, stan-
dardized patterns involving few contingencies and no discretion.
Most will substitutes involve direct payments of cash or
transfers of property either to named beneficiaries or to a class
consisting of the owner's children or descendants who survive
the deceased owner. " 4 More sophisticated dispositions involving
discretionary standards or postponed class gifts normally justify
the additional expense and administrative safeguards of a formal
trust agreement." 5 Even a simple, immediate class gift, though,
may raise constructional problems concerning the intended
treatment of adopted children and children born out of wedlock
or their respective descendants, as well as half-blood relatives.1 '
Since the relevant statutory provisions in the intestacy context
reflect the presumed intent of the average decedent, the revised
UPC sensibly borrows them as constructional rules which apply
not only to wills11 7 but also to donative transfers under other
governing instruments.1 8
"' As alternatives to a lump-sum payment, some conventional will substitutes, such
as life insurance policies, offer various settlement options such as annuities for one or
more lives, or payments over a fixed term or at a fixed rate. Certain employee benefit
plans must offer a "qualified joint-and-survivor annuity" or "qualified preretirement sur-
vivor annuity" See ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); I.R.C.
§§ 401(a)(11), 417 (1988).
215 Accordingly, the UPC provisions added in 1990 concerning certain class gifts and
future interests under trusts are more relevant to long-term trusts than to pure ill sub-
stitutes. See UPC §§ 2-707, 2-711. See generally William F. Fratcher, Class Gifts to
"Heirs," "Issue," and Like Groups, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1205 (1992).
"'6 See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Issues About Issue: Some Recurrent Class Gift
Problems, 48 Mo. L. REV. 333 (1983). As a practical matter, a governing instrument may
address recurring problems either by limiting the permissible types of beneficiary desig-
nations or by establishing constructional rules to resolve ambiguous designations.
11I The original UPC included a similar constructional rule limited to wills. See
UPC § 2-611 (pre-1990).
118 See UPC §§ 2-701, 2-705, 2-708. The revised UPC presumes that if the terms of
a class gift do not differentiate relatives by blood from relatives by affinity the latter are
excluded. In the intestacy context, the UPC treats an individual who lives at least 120
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B. Survival, Lapse and Substitute Takers
Probably the most common source of constructional
problems concerns the unexpected death of a beneficiary either
before or shortly after the death of a property owner. In the will
context, a devisee must survive the testator's death to take any
property under the will; if the devisee predeceases the testator,
the devise fails.119 Unless the will provides an alternative devise
or an antilapse statute applies, the devised property passes as
part of the residuary estate or by intestacy. 20 Similarly, if the
beneficiary of a will substitute fails to meet an applicable sur-
vival requirement,' 2' the underlying property generally passes to
alternative takers under the governing instrument or becomes
part of the owner's probate estate.
Before the promulgation of the original UPC, many states
enacted a simultaneous-death statute which raised a presump-
tion, for purposes of intestacy, devises and other dispositions de-
pendent on the order of deaths, that a beneficiary failed to sur-
vive a testator or owner in the absence of "sufficient evidence
that the persons... died otherwise than simultaneously. '' 122 The
hours after birth as living from the time of conception. UPC § 2-108. Although this pro-
vision arguably is not limited to intestate dispositions, a parallel provision should be
adopted as a rule of construction for wills and will substitutes. Otherwise, a survival
requirement in a governing instrument might defeat the share of a person who was con-
ceived during the owner's life and born after the owner's death.
" See ATKINSON, supra note 12, § 140, at 777-86; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
ERTY (Donative Transfers) § 18.5 (1984). A devise to the estate of a predeceased person
may be 'valid, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Donative Transfers) § 18.5 cmt.
a (1984), as may a devise to the successors or appointees of a predeceased person, see id.
§ 18.4 cmt. e. See generally John 0. Fox, Estate: A Word to Be Used Cautiously, If at
All, 81 HARv. L. REV. 992 (1968); John C. Huston, Transfers to the "Estate" of a Named
Person, 15 SYR. L. REV. 463 (1964).
120 See UPC §§ 2-101, 2-604.
12 The UPC incorporates a mandatory survival requirement in defining beneficial
rights under certain nonprobate transfers at death. See UPC §§ 6-212(a) (multiple-party
account .vith right of survivorship), 6-212(b)(2) (POD account), 6-307 (TOD security re-
gistration). By contrast, in the case of a conventional will substitute, such as a life insur-
ance policy or an inter vivos trust, the governing instrument may expressly require that a
beneficiary survive the owner, but need not do so. Such a disposition fails, however, if
the beneficiary predeceases the attempted creation of a right or interest. See Coucln,
supra note 14, §§ 130-132, 135, at 813-17, 819-20 (life insurance); SCOTT, supra note 13,
§§ 112.3, 128.8, at 166-67, 395-99 (trusts).
122 Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (1953), § 1, 8A U.LA. 557. In the case of mul-
tiple beneficiaries or joint tenants whose rights depend on surviving each other, the stat-
ute treated each beneficiary or joint tenant as owning a ratable share of the property.
See id. §§ 2, 3. The statute also applied specifically to life insurance proceeds. See id.
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statutory presumption of nonsurvival operated as an evidentiary
rule in cases where the order of deaths could not be ascertained.
While the presumption did not impose an independent survival
requirement, it yielded readily to evidence of a beneficiary's sur-
vival. 123 The original UPC introduced a 120-hour survival re-
quirement which largely displaced the simultaneous-death stat-
ute for purposes of intestacy and wills. 124 By'requiring an heir or
devisee to survive for at least 120 hours, the original UPC
avoided the expense and inconvenience (as well as the poten-
tially arbitrary dispositive effects) of passing property through a
second probate estate when deaths occurred in quick succes-
sion.1 25 At the same time, however, the original UPC created an
unwarranted discrepancy between probate and nonprobate
transfers, 12s and invited litigation concerning the effect of boiler-
plate clauses relating to survival or simultaneous deaths.
2 7
§ 4. The presumption of nonsurvival could be rebutted by a different disposition under a
governing instrument. See id. § 6. The uniform statute was substantially revised in 1991
to conform to the revised UPC. See Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (1991), 8A U.,A
557 (Supp. 1992).
'2 In Janus v. Tarasewicz, 482 N.E.2d 418 (M11. App. CL 1935), a husband and wife
died from cyanide poisoning. An insurance policy on the husband's life named the wife
as primary beneficiary and the husband's mother as alternative beneficiary. Ambiguous
evidence concerning the time of the wife's death was held sufficient to support a finding
under the simultaneous-death statute that she survived her husband. As a result, the life
insurance proceeds were payable to the wife's successors rather than the husband's
mother.
" See UPC §§ 2-104, 2-601 (pre-1990). In the will context, the 120-hour survival
requirement did not completely displace the simultaneous-death statute: a Wll might
override the 120-hour survival requirement while leaving the presumption of nonsurvival
under the simultaneous-death statute intact.
125 For example, in Schmitt v. Pierce, 344 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1961), a husband and
wife each died intestate in an automobile accident leaving children from a prior mar-
riage. Although the husband died instantaneously, there was some evidence that the vife
survived for a brief interval Accordingly, under the simultaneous-death statute the
wife's children received not only all of the wife's property but much of the husband's
property as well, to the exclusion of the husband's children. The original UPC would
have produced a different result.
126 For example, in Janus v. Tarasewicz, 482 N.E.2d 418 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985), the
120-hour survival requirement would have prevented the wife (or her successors) from
inheriting the husband's probate assets but would not have applied to the beneficiary
designation under the husband's life insurance policy. See supra note 123.
117 The original UPC's 120-hour survival requirement applied "unless the will of de-
cedent contains some language dealing explicitly with simultaneous deaths or deaths in a
common disaster, or requiring that the devisee survive the testator ..... UPC § 2-601
(pre-1990). If T devises property "to X, or if X does not survive T then to Y," courts
routinely hold that the 120-hour requirement does not apply; if X survives T by even a
moment, X takes the devise. See, e.g., In re Estate of Kerlee, 557 P.2d 599 (Idaho 1976).
1993]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
The 1990 UPC revisions reinforce the 120-hour survival re-
quirement and extend its scope. In the absence of a finding of
contrary intent, the revised UPC treats a beneficiary who fails to
survive an event (including the death of a testator or owner) by
120 hours as having predeceased the event. 2 " Although the 120-
hour period is framed as a constructional rule which may be
overcome by a finditig of a contrary intent, a casual reference in
a governing instrument to survival or simultaneous deaths no
longer suffices to override the statute.129 A survival clause must
state that survival is (or is not) required for a "specified pe-
riod" 130 and a simultaneous-death clause must be "operable
under the facts of the case."'' Moreover, the revised UPC re-
quires "clear and convincing evidence" (rather than mere pre-
ponderance of the evidence) to rebut the presumption of nonsur-
vival. These 1990 UPC amendments should discourage a
deceased beneficiary's successors from challenging the operation
of the 120-hour survival requirement on the basis of ambiguous
language in a governing instrument or eluivocal evidence of
survival.
The revised 120-hour rule applies to a survival requirement
under most will substitutes. 3 2 A technical amendment proposed
in 1993 extends the rule to securities registered in TOD form,
Indeed, under the literal terms of the original UPC, a devise in T's will "to Z, unless T
and Z die in a common disaster" would also override the 120-hour survival requirement,
even if Z died one hour after T from unrelated causes.
128 See UPC § 2-702. For an illuminating discussion of the background and opera-
tion of the revised UPC provisions, see Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 55, at 1091-
1149.
129 See UPC § 2-701 (effect of constructional rules). Even in the absence of specific
provisions in the governing instrument, the statute suspends the 120-hour survival re-
quirement if its application would violate the rule against perpetuities or trigger "an
unintended failure or duplication of a disposition" under "multiple governing instru-
ments." Id. § 2-702(d)(3)-(4).
130 UPC § 2-702(d)(2). Thus, a devise "to X, if she survives" by itself does not ne-
gate the 120-hour period under the revised UPC. See id. § 2-702 cmt.
131 UPC § 2-702(d)(1). Thus, a devise in T's will "to X, but if she dies at the same
time as T or in a common disaster with T, then to Y" does not override the 120-hour
survival requirement unless T and X actually die simultaneously or in a common disas-
ter. See id. § 2-702 cmt.
12 See UPC § 2-702(a)-(b). The rule applies for purposes of the UPC and any don-
ative provision of a governing instrument, other than TOD security registration. In light
of the expanded rule, the separate 120-hour survival requirement for intestate succession
appears redundant, although it remains unclear whether the 120-hour survival require-
ment applies when it results in escheat. See id. § 2-104.
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which were .conspicuously omitted from the 1990 version of the
statute. 3 Indeed, even without the technical amendment, a reg-
istering entity that wished to do so could have adopted the 120-
hour survival requirement as part of the terms and conditions of
TOD registration.1 34 By the same token, notwithstanding the ex-
tension of the general rule to TOD security registrations, a regis-
tering entity has the same opportunity as any other payor to
override the 120-hour survival requirement by an explicit provi-
sion in the governing instrument.
When a disposition fails because an applicable survival re-
quirement is not met, the disposition of the underlying property
may raise additional constructional problems. In the will con-
text, an "antilapse" statute does not prevent a devise from fail-
ing; it prevents the property from becoming part of the testa-
tor's general assets by implying a substitute disposition in favor
of the predeceased devisee's surviving descendants, if any. The
original UPC, for example, provided such a substitute disposi-
tion if the predeceased devisee was a grandparent, or a lineal
descendant of a grandparent, of the testator.1 36 Like other rules
of construction, antilapse statutes yield to a contrary intent ex-
pressed in the will.13 Courts routinely hold that a bare survival
requirement in a will sufficiently expresses an intent to negate
the application of a conventional antilapse statute, even if as a
result the property passes by intestacy or in a manner clearly
not intended by the testator.1 37 Occasionally, however, courts
" The official comment to the 1990 version explained that for purposes of the TOD
provisions survival was used in the conventional sense of "outliving another for any time
interval no matter how brief ... to avoid imposition of a new and unfamiliar meaning of
the term on intermediaries familiar with the meaning of 'survive' in joint tenancy regis-
trations." UPC § 6-301 cmt.
'' See id. § 6-310(a) (registering entity may establish terms and conditions for ac-
cepting and implementing registrations in beneficiary form).
'" The deceased devisee's descendants who survived the testator by 120 hours took
their ancestor's devise as substitute takers by representation. See id. § 2-605 (pre-1990).
,' See UPC, art. 2, pt. 6, general cmt. (pre-1990).
137 For example, in In re Estate of Stroble, 636 P.2d 236 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981), the
testator's will purported to disinherit her estranged husband, and devised the residuary
estate to her mother "if she shall survive me by 30 days." The testator and her mother
died on the same date; since the mother failed to survive for 30 days, the actual order of
deaths was immaterial. The court held that the survival requirement prevented applica-
tion of the antilapse statute, with the result that the residuary estate passed to the testa-
tor's husband by intestacy. See also Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Beach, 495
N.E.2d 1173 (IlM App. Ct. 1986); In re Estate of Burruss, 394 N.V.2d 466 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1986). But see In re Estate of Bulger, 586 N.E.2d 673 (I1. App. CL 1991); Estate of
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strain to avoid a lapse by interpreting a survival requirement as
inapplicable or satisfied on particular facts. 138
The 1990 UPC revisions attempt to give the antilapse stat-
ute for wills "the widest possible latitude to operate" without
foreclosing inquiry into the testator's intent.' For example, the
revised statute expressly provides that "words of survivorship..
. are not, in the absence of additional evidence, a sufficient indi-
cation" of an intent to override antilapse treatment. 40 The stat-
ute also provides that an alternative devise conditioned on the
nonsurvival of the primary devisee supersedes a substitute dis-
position "only if an expressly designated devisee of the alterna-
tive devise is entitled to take under the will."'' Thus, a residu-
ary clause that specifically includes "all lapsed or failed
nonresiduary devises" apparently prevents the antilapse statute
from operating on non-residuary devises. " 2 The revised anti-
Kehler, 411 A.2d 748 (Pa. 1980).
"' See, e.g., In re Estate of Ulrikson, 290 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1980) (residuary de-
vise to testator's brother and sister or the survivor; words of survivorship did not apply
where both siblings predeceased testator, leaving antilapse statute free to operate); Hen-
derson v. Parker, 728 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1987) (devise to "surviving children" interpreted
to mean children living at execution of will).
See UPC § 2-603 cmt.
140 See id. § 2-603(b)(3). This reversal of a substantial body of case law concerning
the effect of words of survivorship, see supra note 137 and accompanying text, has
proved especially controversial. See Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code:
Older and Better, or More Like the Internal Revenue Code?, 77 MINN. L. REV. 639, 649-
57 (1993); Mary Louise Fellows, Traveling the Road of Probate Reform: Finding the
Way to Your Will (A Response to Professor Ascher), 77 MINN. L. REV. 659, 674-80
(1993); Mark L. Ascher, A Response to Professor Fellows, 77 MINN. L. REV. 683, 683-87
(1993); Averill, supra note 2, at 921-25; Martin T. Begleiter, Article 11 of the Uniform
Probate Code and the Malpractice Revolution, 59 TENN. L. REV. 101, 126-30 (1991);
Sheldon F. Kurtz, Powers of Appointment Under the 1990 Uniform Probate Code:
What Was Done-What Remains to be Done, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1151, 1188-89 (1992);
Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 55, at 1109-15.
141 UPC § 2-603(b)(4). Thus, if T devises property "to X, or if X predeceases T to
Y" and X predeceases T leaving issue who survive T by 120 hours, the alternative devise
to Y takes effect if Y survives T by 120 hours. If Y fails to survive T by 120 hours, the
substitute gift to X's issue takes effect. See id. § 2-603 cmt. The revised statute also
codifies the result in In re Estate of Ulrikson, 290 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1980). See id. § 2-
603 cmt., example 5 (1990).
12 See UPC § 2-603(a)(1). Indeed, the official comment describes such a clause as a
"foolproof" method of negating the application of the antilapse statute. Id. § 2-603 cmt.
Nevertheless, just as words of survivorship may represent "no more than a casual dupli-
cation of the survivorship requirement imposed by the rule of lapse, with no independent
purpose," Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 55, at 1109, broad language like that quoted
in the text may well represent no more than a casual duplication of the dispositive effect
of the rule of lapse.
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lapse statute cannot completely eliminate uncertainty concern-
ing its application in particular cases, any more than it can com-
pel clarity in will drafting. The statute does, however, reduce the
likelihood of litigation in marginal cases and may help to imple-
ment the average testator's probable intent.
The rationale of the antilapse statute applies with equal
force to nonprobate transfers. In view of the close analogy be-
tween a specific devise and a beneficiary designation, the 1990
UPC revisions introduce a separate statute for deathtime trans-
fers of nonprobate assets which mirrors the antilapse statute. 43
The UPC drafters speculate that the nonprobate statute may be
especially helpful because many beneficiary designations are
drafted without the assistance of a lawyer.144 As a practical mat-
ter, however, miny institutional payors use standardized gov-
erning instruments that expressly provide for the contingency of
a predeceased beneficiary. 4r The impact of the nonprobate stat-
ute should closely approximate that of the antilapse statute.
In the'trust context, the UPC introduces a separate statute
for future interests under trusts which replaces the traditional
constructional preference for early vesting with a statutory pre-
sumption modeled on the antilapse statute.140  The statute
143 See UPC § 2-706. The official comment to the antilapse statute indicates that it
would be "anomalous" to treat devises and beneficiary designations differently in this
respect. Id. § 2-603 cmt. Although wills and beneficiary designations require different
terminology, the two statutes are essentially identical in operation, except that the provi-
sions of the antilapse statute concerning residuary devises have no counterpart in the
nonprobate context. A technical amendment proposed in 1993 provides that the statute
does not apply to property held in joint tenancy or joint accounts, although it apparently
does apply to POD accounts and securities registered in TOD form. For most other pur-
poses, the UPC treats a joint account as a revocable transfer rather than a joint tenancy.
See id. § 1-201(26).
1" See id. § 2-603 cmt. On the other hand, the cases concerning ills drafted by
lawyers offer little reason to expect that the participation of a lawyer would alleviate the
need for a statutory solution.
15 The UPC provides that a TOD registration may include a substitute disposition
to a named beneficiary's "lineal descendants per stirpes" ("LDPS"). It also authorizes a
registering entity to establish terms and conditions which may-or may not-include a
provision "substituting a named beneficiary's descendants to take in the place of the
named beneficiary in the event of the beneficiary's death." UPC § 6-310(a); cf. Mo, Rev.
STAT. § 461.045 (1986 & Supp. 1992) (antilapse presumption for certain nonprobate
transfers, rebuttable by including "no LDPS" in beneficiary designation).
146 See UPC § 2-707. For a detailed discussion of this provision, see Fratcher, supra
note 115. Under the traditional approach, a future interest failed entirely if the benefi-
ciary did not meet an applicable survival requirement. Courts often avoided this result
by invoking a constructional preference for early vesting which ensured that a vested
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presumes that a trust beneficiary must survive to the time the
beneficiary's interest becomes possessory; if the beneficiary dies
before that time the statute provides a substitute disposition in
favor of the beneficiary's surviving descendants, if any. Although
the statute sweeps more broadly than the antilapse statute, it
represents a substantial step toward harmonizing the treatment
of wills and trusts that function as will substitutes.147
C. Divorce
Another recurring constructional problem arises when a tes-
tator or owner becomes divorced but fails to revoke provisions
for the former spouse under a will or will substitute executed
before the divorce.' 48 In the absence of an applicable statute, di-
vorce alone has no effect on the former spouse's rights as a devi-
see, beneficiary or joint tenant.14 The UPC, however, like most
contemporary probate codes, provides that divorce automatically
revokes any disposition previously made by will to the testator's
future interest passed to the deceased beneficiary's testate or intestate successors. See,
e.g., Hinds v. McNair, 413 N.E.2d 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Detroit Bank & Trust Co. V.
Grout, 289 N.W.2d 898 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); cf. Zweifel v. Dougherty, 761 S.W.2d 215
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (deed of land). By abolishing the preference for early vesting, the
UPC opens the way to introduce antilapse principles by analogy into the law of trusts.
" The UPC's rule for trusts, unlike the antilapse statute for wills, does not require
any particular relationship between the settlor and the beneficiary. Moreover, its implied
survivorship requirement relates to the time a beneficial interest becomes possessory,
which need not coincide with the settlor's death. Commentators, and occasionally courts,
have endorsed the notion of applying antilapse principles either directly or by analogy to
revocable trusts that function as will substitutes. See Dewire v. Haveles, 534 N.E.2d 782
(Mass. 1989); Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Turner, 529 N.E.2d 1261 (Ohio 1988); In re
Estate of Button, 490 P.2d 731 (Wash. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY (Don-
ative Transfers) § 27.1 cmt. e, § 27.2 cmt. f (1987). A few states have enacted statutes
adopting a comparable constructional rule. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6147 (West
1991) (devise to kindred of testator or testator's spouse); ILL. COMP. STAT, ch. 755, § 5/4-
11 (1992) (devise to testator's descendant); 20 PA CoNs. STAT. § 2514 (1992) (devise to
class); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 32-3-104 (1984) (class gift).
148 For this purpose, the UPC treats divorce and annulment identically. See UPC
§2 2-804(a)(2), 2-804(b)(1); UPC § 2-508 (pre-1990). On the former spouse's rights as
beneficiary of life insurance and other will substitutes generally, see Mark Davis, Note,
Life Insurance Beneficiaries and Divorce, 65 TEx. L. REv. 635 (1987); Robert J. Lynn,
Will Substitutes, Divorce, and Statutory Assistance for the Unthinking Donor, 71
MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1987); Alan S. Wilmit, Note, Applying the Doctrine of Revocation by
Divorce to Life Insurance Policies, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 653 (1988).
149 See ATKINSON, supra note 12, § 85, at 431-32 (wills); COUCH, supra note 14,
§ 112, at 777-85 (life insurance); II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.2, at 7-11 (A. James
Casner ed., 1952 & Supp. 1977) (joint tenancy).
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former spouse, unless the will expressly provides otherwise. 10
While framed in terms of revocation by operation of law,'"" the
statute operates as a rule of construction. In effect, it makes any
devise to a person who is a spouse of the testator at or after the
execution of the will conditional on the devisee being married to
the testator at the testator's death, unless the will expresses a
contrary intent. Since most revocation-by-divorce statutes refer
expressly to wills, however, courts have generally refused to ap-
ply them directly or by analogy to will substitutes.0 2 Some
courts, however, have adopted a more flexible approach.
In Clymer v. Mayo 153 the court broke new ground by apply-
ing a revocation-by-divorce statute to an inter vivos trust. In
that case, the settlor, while married, executed a will and an un-
funded revocable trust agreement that included substantial dis-
positions in favor of her husband if he survived her. The trust
was to be funded at the settlor's death with a pourover devise of
her residuary estate and with proceeds of retirement annuity
contracts payable at death directly to the trustees. The settlor
divorced and then died without having amended the will, the
trust agreement or the beneficiary designation in the annuity
contracts. The court recognized that the will and the trust were
"integrally related components of a single testamentary scheme"
and that to treat them as separate dispositions would produce
"inconsistent results."'0 4 Accordingly, the court applied the stat-
150 See UPC § 2-804(b)(1); UPC § 2-508 (pre-1990). Like the original UPC, the re-
vised UPC also revokes powers of appointment created in or exercised in favor of the
former spouse, and any nomination of the former spouse as a fiduciary. If the testator
remarries the former spouse, any provisions revoked solely by the divorce are revived.
See UPC § 2-804(e); UPC § 2-508 (pre-1990).
151 This approach stems from the common-law doctrine of revocation by operation
of law on subsequent marriage (in the case of a woman) or marriage and birth of issue
(in the case of a man). See ATKINSON, supra note 12, § 85, at 431-32. The original UPC,
like most contemporary probate codes, protects the surviving spouse's rights in a more
sophisticated manner, see UPC §§ 2-201, 2-301, and sharply limits revocation by opera-
tion of law, see id. § 2-804(f).
152 See, e.g., Adams Estate, 288 A.2d 514 (Pa. 1972) (life insurance); Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y v. Stitzel, 1 Pa. Fiduc. 2d 316 (1981) (life insurance).
473 N.E.2d 1084 (Mass. 1985).
473 N.E.2d at 1092. Outright devises under the settlor's will to her former spouse
were deemed revoked under the statute and fell into the residuary estate which poured
over to the trust. The trust included a marital deduction portion (Trust A) and a residu-
ary portion (Trust B) with income payable to the former spouse for life. Since the settlor
was unmarried at death, the marital deduction was unavailable and Trust A failed for
impossibility;, consequently, all the assets that poured over from the %ill ended up in
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ute directly to the trust, with the result that the former spouse
forfeited his interest in all the trust property, including the an-
nuity contract proceeds which never passed through the probate
estate. 155 Although the court in Clymer narrowly tailored its
holding to the facts before it, the court left open the possibility
of fashioning an analogous constructional rule for will substi-
tutes that fall outside the scope of the revocation-by-divorce
statute. 56
In the absence of an applicable statute, unrevoked benefi-
ciary designations in favor of a divorced owner's former spouse
continue to breed litigation. A comprehensive property settle-
ment agreement in connection with the divorce may merely
compound the problem. In contrast to the liberal construction of
such agreements with respect to probate assets, 57 most courts
Trust B. Failure to apply the statute to Trust B would have restored to the former
spouse a life income interest in the very assets which he forfeited under the statute. The
court could have reached the same result, while avoiding the issue of impossibility, by
applying the statute to Trust A as well as to Trust B.
"I Although the court might have strained the doctrine of incorporation by refer-
ence to reach a similar result, it sensibly declined to do so. See 473 N.E.2d at 1093.
Properly applied, incorporation by reference merely validates dispositions in a will by
reference to certain written instruments; it does not modify the terms of the incorpo-
rated instrument, nor does it transform nonprobate assets into probate assets. But cf.
Miller v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 637 P.2d 75 (Okla. 1981) (relying on incorpora-
tion by reference to bring unfunded pourover trust within scope of revocation-by-divorce
statute).
'01 The court restricted its holding to "the particular facts of this case-specifically
the existence of a revocable pour-over trust funded entirely ht the time of the decedent's
death." 473 N.E.2d at 1093. (Some commentators might argue that the trust was funded
in part when the settlor designated beneficiaries under the annuity contracts.) Had the
trust been funded in part during life and in part at death, the court might well have
refused to apply the revocation-by-divorce statute while reaching the same result under
an analogous constructional rule.
Lower courts, however, may be reluctant to fashion such a constructional rule. In
Stiles v. Stiles, 487 N.E.2d 874 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986), an employee, divorced and remar-
ried, died without having expressly revoked a pre-divorce beneficiary designation in
favor of his former spouse. In determining that the decedent's surviving spouse (rather
than his former spouse) was entitled to receive the decedent's accrued vacation and sick
pay, the court relied on statutes specifically governing the benefits in question and did
not cite Clymer.
"I The UPC, for example, presumes that a "complete property settlement" in con-
nection with a divorce operates as a waiver by each spouse of any elective share, statu-
tory allowance or benefit passing from the other spouse by intestate succession or under
a previously-executed will. See UPC § 2-204(d). Indeed, the statutory presumption ap-
plies if the property settlement is entered into after or in anticipation of separation, even
if no divorce is sought or obtained. A parallel rule of construction for nonprobate assets
would further reduce disparities between the treatment of wills and will substitutes.
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hold that an agreement awarding exclusive ownership of a life
insurance policy or pension account to one spouse has no effect
on an existing beneficiary designation in favor of the other
spouse unless the beneficiary spouse explicitly waives the right
to receive the property at the owner-spouse's death.5 8 Of course,
a court may find that a particular agreement sufficiently ex-
presses the spouses' intent to terminate an existing beneficiary
designation even in the absence of an explicit waiver. 50 Several
states have attempted to reduce litigation and give effect to the
average owner's presumed intent by enacting revocation-by-di-
vorce statutes concerning contractual death benefits, 00 revoca-
ble trusts 1 ' and joint tenancies.18 2
I" See COUCH, supra note 14, § 115, at 791-95; see, e.g., Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill,
877 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1989) (qualified profit sharing plan); In re Estate of Schleis, 642
P.2d 164 (N.M. 1982) (life insurance); Culbertson v. Continental Assurance Co., 631 P.2d
906 (Utah 1981) (profit-sharing plan and life insurance); Bersch v. VanKleeck, 334
N.W.2d 114 (Wis. 1983) (life insurance). One court, however, has recently adopted a pre-
sumption that a comprehensive property settlement overrides existing designations of
life insurance beneficiaries. See Vasconi v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 590 A.2d 1161 (NJ.
1991).
Under certain employee benefit plans, at the death of a divorced participant a bene-
ficiary designation in favor of the surviving former spouse must generally be respected
except to the extent overridden by a "qualified domestic relations order" or by the right
of a surviving spouse to receive a survivor annuity. See McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d
310 (6th Cir. 1990) (surviving spouse entitled to half proceeds as survivor annuity, for-
mer spouse designated as beneficiary entitled to balance); cf. Fox Valley & Vicinity Con-
struction Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (di-
vided court upheld beneficiary's specific waiver by analogy to life insurance cases).
I'l See, e.g., Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Stoddard, 516 P.2d 187 (Idaho 1973) (life
insurance); Sorenson v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477 (Iowa 1984) (life insurance); Hollaway v.
Selvidge, 548 P.2d 835 (Kan. 1976) (life insurance); Phillips v. Pelton, 461 N.E2d 305
(Ohio 1984) (life insurance).
10o The Ohio and Oklahoma statutes cover a variety of contractual death benefits,
including life insurance, annuities, POD accounts and employee death benefits. See OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.63 (1988 & Supp. 1992); OKA. STAT, tit. 15, § 178 (1991). The
Michigan and Texas statutes apply specifically to life insurance, annuities and employee
benefits. See MICH. CoiaP. LAws § 552.101 (1991); TFx. FAL CODE ANN. §§ 3.632, .633
(West 1993).
The Missouri nonprobate transfers law provides that when a nonprobate transfer is
revoked by, divorce, the owner's surviving spouse and children (or their descendants), if
any, automatically become entitled to the underlying property, without regard to any
alternative disposition provided in the governing instrument See Mo. Rzv. STAT.
§ 461.051(1) (1986 & Supp. 1992). The substitute disposition under the Missouri law not
only departs from the analogous provision for wills but may drastically distort the
owner's dispositive plan. The substitute disposition does not apply to life insurance or to
revocable trusts. See id. §§ 461.073(5)-.073(6).
16, See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1339.62 (1988); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175
(1991).
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The 1990 UPC revisions extend the revocation-by-divorce
statute to cover virtually all will substitutes. The revised statute
provides that divorce revokes any revocable disposition made by
a divorced individual in favor of the former spouse under a will
or other governing instrument executed before divorce.16 3 Re-
voked dispositions include not only devises but also revocable
beneficiary designations with respect to deathtime transfers of
nonprobate assets and revocable dispositions under a deed or
trust.16 4 The dispositive provisions of the governing instrument
take effect "as if the former spouse and relatives of the former
spouse disclaimed the revoked provisions."16 5 In addition, the re-
vised statute provides that divorce severs any joint tenancy be-
tween spouses.' Statutory revocation occurs automatically on
divorce, except as provided by the "express terms" of a gov-
erning instrument, court order or property settlement agree-
ment. 67 Although courts may occasionally have to determine
whether particular language overrides the statutory presumption
in favor of revocation,168 the revised statute represents a signifi-
12 See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 552.102 (1991); OfIo R.v. CoxE ANN.
§ 5302.20(c)(5) (1986).
163 See UPC § 2-804.
164 Statutory revocation does not apply, however, to a disposition made by one per-
son in favor of another person's former spouse. Thus, if A's parent creates a trust for the
benefit of A and A's spouse B, with a power exercisable solely by A to revoke or amend
the trust, a divorce between A and B does not revoke the provisions in favor of B.
165 UPC § 2-804(d). Thus, in the case of a will and most will substitutes, the former
spouse and relatives are treated as predeceased. See id. §§ 2-804(d) (effect of revoca-
tion), 2-801(d) (effect of disclaimer). The original UPC provided simply that the revoked
devise passed as if the former spouse predeceased the testator. See UPC § 2-508 (pre-
1990). A technical amendment proposed in 1993 revises the provision as described in
text, to clarify that revoked dispositions may pass to descendants of the former spouse as
substitute takers under an antilapse (or similar) statute.
166 UPC § 2-804(b)(2). The UPC excludes a multiple-party account with right of
survivorship-including a reclassified common-law joint account-from the definition of
a joint tenancy. See id. § 1-201(26). Presumably, a divorce would merely eliminate the
survivorship right of each spouse in such an account but would not affect the lifetime
ownership rights of the respective spouses.
167 Id. § 2-804(b).
168 For example, if a property settlement agreement states that "beneficiary designa-
tions shall be treated as revoked only as expressly provided herein," should the quoted
language prevent revocation, in the absence of any provision concerning a particular ben-
eficiary designation? Courts have faced a similar problem in determining whether a gen-
eral waiver of property rights is sufficiently explicit to override the common-law pre-
sumption against revocation. Faced with ambiguous language, one court has resorted to
extrinsic evidence of intent. See, e.g., Life Ins. Co. of North America v. Cassidy, 676 P.2d
1050 (Cal. 1984).
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cant step toward reducing litigation and preventing unintended
dispositive consequences.
Under the revised UPC, divorce also revokes dispositions
made by a divorced individual in favor of the former spouse's
relatives to the same extent as those in favor of the former
spouse."6 9 This innovation would have a substantial impact on a
case like Clymer, for example, where the trust provided an alter-
native disposition in favor of the settlor's "nephews and
nieces"--all related to the settlor solely through her former
spouse.170 The Clymer court, applying the original UPC, refused
to imply a revocation of the disposition in favor of the former
spouse's relatives.1 7 1 By contrast, the revised UPC would revoke
the alternative disposition, based on an untested assumption
about the likely level of antagonism between a divorced individ-
ual and the former spouse's relatives.172 The UPC should proba-
bly limit the strong presumption of revocation to dispositions in
favor of the former spouse, where revocation reflects the di-
vorced individual's probable intent most reliably, and allow
more flexibility in interpreting other dispositions.
I' UPC § 2-804(b)(1). The former spouse's relatives do not include any individual
who, after the divorce, was related to the decedent by blood, adoption or affinity. Id. § 2-
804(a)(5). Thus, for example, a disposition in favor of a former spouse's child who was
adopted by the decedent is not revoked.
170 473 N.E.2d 1084, 1094 (Mass. 1985). The trust instrument provided for discre-
tionary distributions to the settlor's nephews and nieces if her husband failed to survive
her. Since the statute provided that a revoked devise passed as if the former spouse
failed to survive the decedent, the express condition of the husband's nonsurvival did
not prevent the alternative disposition to the nephews and nieces from taking effect. The
revised UPC presumes that a class gift to "nephews and nieces" excludes relatives by
affinity, see UPC § 2-705(a), but the presumption should be rebutted if, as in Clymer,
there were no living blood relatives who met the class description when the governing
instrument was executed. See REsrATEErr (SECOND) OF PaoPzmrr (Donative Transfers)
§ 25.8 cmt. e (1987).
171 473 N.E.2d at 1095-96. In this respect, the Clymer court's interpretation of the
statute is typical. See, e.g., Porter v. Porter, 286 N.W.2d 649 (Iowa 1979) (devise to for-
mer spouse's child); Bloom v. Selfon, 555 A.2d 75 (Pa. 1989) (devise to former spouse's
uncle).
172 "[D]uring the divorce process or in the aftermath of the divorce, the former
spouse's relatives are likely to side with the former spouse, breaking down or weakening
any former ties that may previously have developed between the transferor and the for-
mer spouse's relatives ..... UPC § 2-804 cmt. But see Porter v. Porter, 286 N.W.2d 649
(Iowa 1979) (finding testator intended to favor former spouse's child over own children).
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D. Homicide
A person who unlawfully and intentionally kills another
generally forfeits any right to receive property from the victim
by testate or intestate succession. 173 In many states, early deci-
sions reaching a contrary result have been reversed by statute. 174
In the absence of an applicable statute, contemporary courts
hold that the killer either takes no legal title to the victim's
property or takes title as constructive trustee for the benefit of
the victim's other successors.175 Although the general principles
of preventing the killer's unjust enrichment and preserving the
victim's dispositive freedom should produce comparable results
in the context of will substitutes such as life insurance,1 6 joint
bank accounts 17 and other jointly-owned property,178 applying
these principles has proved especially troublesome in two
respects.
First, a statute that expressly regulates the effect of homi-
cide on testate or intestate succession but does not extend to
will substitutes may produce anomalous results. This problem is
'7 On the common-law background and the statutory response to the problem of
killer-beneficiaries generally, see Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely A
Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L. REV. 489 (1986); Linda J. Maki & Alan M. Kaplan, Elmer's
Case Revisited: The Problem of the Murdering Heir, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 905 (1980); Wil-
liam M. McGovern, Jr., Homicide and Succession To Property, 68 Mwii. L. REV. 65
(1969); John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property By Willfully Killing Another-A Statu-
tory Solution, 49 HARv. L. REv. 715 (1936).
11" Examples of statutes enacted to overrule early cases are noted in Bradley v. Fox,
129 N.E.2d 699 (Ill. 1955); In re Estate of Foster, 320 P.2d 855 (Kan. 1958); Garner v.
Phillips, 47 S.E.2d 845 (N.C. 1948); and In re Tarlo's Estate, 172 A. 139 (Pa. 1934).
'7 While several older leading cases held that the killer acquired no legal title, see,
e.g., Perry v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641 (Mo. 1908); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22
N.E. 188 (1889), modern courts favor the constructive trust approach, see, e.g., Kelley v.
State, 196 A.2d 68 (N.H. 1963); Garner v. Phillips, 47 S.E.2d 845 (N.C. 1948); In re Will
of Wilson, 92 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. 1958). Although the distinctions between the two ap-
proaches are mainly procedural, a bona fide purchaser from the killer would be protected
only under the constructive-trust approach. On constructive trusts generally, see RE-
STATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 187 (1937). Scorr, supra note 13, § 492, at 436-40.
"I See CoucH, supra note 14, §§ 27:149-:165, at 840-69; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITU-
TION § 189 (1937); Scorr, supra note 13, § 494.1, at 486-92.
177 See, e.g., Glass v. Adkins, 436 So. 2d 844 (Ala. 1983) (killer forfeited right to
account where victim furnished consideration); Vesey v. Vesey, 54 N.W.2d 385 (Minn.
1952) (same). But cf. Smith v. Greenburg, 218 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1950) (statutory survivor-
ship right not qualified by equitable principles); Oleff v. Hodapp, 195 N.E. 838 (Ohio
1935) (same).
'7 See AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 149, § 6.4, at 16-18; RESTATEMENT
OF RESTITUTION § 188 (1937); see also infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
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illustrated by two Illinois decisions involving the same facts. A
wife killed her husband, who died intestate and without having
made an effective beneficiary designation under his state pen-
sion plan. The wife was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. In
the first decision, the court held, as a matter of common law,
that the wife's intentional killing of her husband disqualified her
as a "survivor" eligible for death benefits under the husband's
pension plan. Accordingly, the death benefits became part of the
husband's probate estate. 79 In the second decision, the court
held that a statute which treated a convicted murderer as having
predeceased the victim for purposes of testate and intestate suc-
cession did not disqualify the wife as sole heir for purposes of
intestate succession.1 80 The statute superseded the common law
disqualification for purposes of the probate code: since the wife
stood convicted of manslaughter, not murder, neither the statute
nor the common law barred her from taking the husband's prop-
erty (including the death benefits from the pension plan) by in-
testate succession. The court apparently saw no anomaly in per-
mitting the wife to receive indirectly, through administration,
the same death benefits that she was not permitted to receive
directly by nonprobate transfer.
A second problem involves the effect of homicide on a Will
substitute, such as a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety,
which confers equal undivided lifetime ownership rights coupled
with a right of survivorship. In the common case where two
spouses are the only co-tenants, the incidents of both types of
tenancy are substantially identical except that a joint tenancy
may be severed by either spouse acting alone while a tenancy by
the entirety cannot be severed during marriage without the con-
sent of both spouses. When one spouse kills the other, courts
have taken divergent views of the extent to which the killer
should be permitted to retain a beneficial interest in the under-
lying property, often without distinguishing between the two
forms of co-ownership.18' Two alternative approaches have be-
"" Seipel v. State Employees' Retirement System, 289 N.,.2d 288 (Ill. App. Ct.
1972).
"I0 Estate of Seipel, 329 N.E.2d 419 (Ml1 App. CL 1975). Both cases were decided by
unanimous three-judge panels, including two judges who participated in both decisions.
183 Professor Scott identifies at least five judicial approaches in discussing the extent
to which the killer should be permitted to retain property held in joint tenancy or ten-
ancy by the entirety when the killer is the victim's spouse and there are no other surviv-
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come widely accepted. Under one view, the homicide severs the
co-tenancy, leaving the victim and the killer (or their respective
successors) with equal undivided interests in the property as te-
nants in common. 182 Under the other view, the killer retains a
beneficial income interest for life (or its commuted value), but
holds the rest of the property as constructive trustee for the vic-
tim's other successors. 18 3 Both approaches are based on the no-
tion that the killer should neither gain nor lose as a result of the
homicide, but should be put in the same position as if the homi-
cide had not occurred. 84 The discrepancy between the alterna-
tive measures of gain or loss reflects the difficulty of ascertaining
how long each co-tenant would have lived and how long the co-
tenancy would have lasted had the homicide not occurred.
Courts do not hesitate to resolve factual uncertainties arising
from the homicide against the killer."85
The original UPC disqualified a person who "feloniously
and intentionally" killed another from taking property as a re-
sult of the victim's death by testate or intestate succession or as
designated beneficiary under a life insurance policy or other con-
tractual arrangement. 86 In the case of a joint tenancy or multi-
ple-party account, the original UPC treated the homicide as sev-
ering the joint tenancy and defeating the killer's right of
ing co-tenants: (1) the killer retains the entire property (see Beddingfield v. Estill &
Newman, 100 S.W. 108 (Tenn. 1907)); (2) the killer retains the entire property subject to
an equitable charge for the commuted value of the victim's life interest (see Sherman v.
Weber, 167 A. 517 (N.J. Ch. 1933)); (3) the killer retains a life estate in the entire prop-
erty (see Bryant v. Bryant, 137 S.E. 188 (N.C. 1927)), or a lien for the commuted value of
a life estate in half the property (see Neiman v. Hurff, 93 A.2d 345 (N.J. 1952)); (4) the
killer retains nothing (see Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y.S. 173 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1918)); and (5) the killer retains an undivided one-half interest as tenant in
common (see Grose v. Holland, 211 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. 1948)). See ScoTr, supra note 13,
§ 493.2, at 475-85.
182 The killer, of course, is barred from taking any portion of the victim's share. See,
e.g., Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1951); Bradley v. Fox, 129 N.E.2d 699 (Ill.
1955); Maine Savings Bank v. Bridges, 431 A.2d 633 (Me. 1981); Grose v. Holland, 211
S.W.2d 464 (Mo. 1948); Duncan v. Vassaur, 550 P.2d 929 (Okla. 1976); In re Estate of
Safran, 306 N.W.2d 27 (Wis. 1981).
18" See, e.g., Neiman v. Hurff, 93 A.2d 345 (N.J. 1952); Hargrove v. Taylor, 389 P.2d
36 (Or. 1964); Colton v. Wade, 80 A.2d 923 (Del. Ch. 1951); see also RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION § 188 (1937).
184 In other words, to prevent unjust enrichment, the killer should disgorge any ben-
efit to the extent-but only to the extent-attributable to the homicide.
"' See Scorr, supra note 13, § 493.2, at 479-80; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§ 187 cmt. a (1937).
"" See UPC §§ 2-803(a), (c) (pre-1990).
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survivorship. 187 Whether a killing was felonious and intentional
was determined conclusively by a conviction in criminal pro-
ceedings or by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil pro-
ceeding.1 8 Situations not specifically covered were to be treated
"in accordance with the principles of [the statute]." 89 Under the
original UPC, the estate of the victim passed "as if the [disquali-
fied] killer had predeceased the decedent."19 0 One problem with
this mechanical rule may be illustrated by a hypothetical exam-
ple. Assume that the victim (G) is unmarried and has two chil-
dren, of whom one is the disqualified killer (A) and the other is
actually predeceased (B). If G dies intestate, survived at least
120 hours by A, A's two children and B's only child, the literal
terms of the original UPC gave B's child only one third of G's
estate instead of the half the child would have taken had A died
of natural causes. 91
The 1990 UPC revisions refine the original statute in several
respects and reformulate the operative provisions in terms sub-
stantially parallel to the revocation-by-divorce statute."9 2 The
revised statute expressly applies to intestate succession, joint
tenancies and dispositions under a will or other governing in-
strument. A felonious and intentional killing 3 is treated as re-
187 Id. § 2-803(b) (pre-1990). The provision included tenancies by the entirety in
brackets, presumably to accommodate local variations in existing case law.
es Id. § 2-803(e) (pre-1990). Thus, a killer who was acquitted or entered a negoti-
ated plea bargain to a lesser offense in a criminal proceeding might still be disqualified in
a civil proceeding. Similarly, if the killer committed suicide before trial the question of
disqualification might be raised in a civil proceeding. See id. cmt.
189 Id. § 2-803(d) (pre-1990).
19o Id. § 2-803(a) (pre-1990).
191 See UPC §§ 2-803(a) (estate passes as if B predeceased A), 2-103 (estate passes
to A's descendants by representation), 2-106 (each child of B or C takes equal share if B
and C both predeceased; B's children take one half and C's child takes one half if B not
predeceased) (pre-1990); JESSE DuK uNiR & STAN LEY M. JoHIusoN. WiLLS. T srs AND
EsTATEs 120-21, 124-25 (4th ed. 1990).
192 See UPC § 2-803.
193 The standard for determining a felonious and intentional killing remains sub-
stantially unchanged. In the absence of a criminal conviction, an interested person may
seek a determination "whether, under the preponderance of evidence standard, the indi-
vidual would be found criminally accountable for the felonious and intentional killing of
the decedent." Id. § 2-803(g). This language is apparently intended to clarify that an
accomplice or co-conspirator as well as a killer may be disqualified. See id. cmt. Unfortu-
nately, it could be read to require a finding (by a preponderance of the evidence) that an
individual would actually have been found criminally accountable-i.e., convicted under
a reasonable-doubt standard-had a criminal proceeding taken place. It should, however,
be read to require only that the substantive elements of a felonious and intentional kill-
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voking any disposition under a will or governing instrument in
the killer's favor that the victim could have unilaterally re-
voked;1 9 4 provisions that are not revoked take effect "as if the
killer disclaimed all revoked provisions.1 91 5 A felonious and in-
tentional killing also converts a joint tenancy or tenancy by the
entirety between the killer and the victim into a tenancy in com-
mon.196 Finally, the statute directs that any "wrongful acquisi-
tion" of property by a killer not otherwise covered be treated "in
accordance with the principle that a killer cannot profit from his
[or her] wrong. 1 97 This open-ended provision may reflect a rec-
ognition by the UPC drafters that even a well-conceived statute
lacks the flexibility of traditional equitable remedies for unjust
enrichment.
E. Disclaimer
A person who refuses to accept an interest in property
under a will or will substitute usually does so with the intent
either to shield the property from creditors' claims or to reduce
the impact of gift, estate or inheritance taxes. A valid disclaimer
defeats the disposition in favor of the disclaimant and permits
the disclaimed interest to pass directly to alternative or residu-
ary takers under the will or other governing instrument, or by
intestate succession.19e Since a disclaimer "relates back" to the
ing be proved by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil proceeding.
91 Id. § 2-803(c)(1). Multiple-party accounts with right of survivorship are treated
as revocable dispositions rather than joint tenancies. See id. §§ 1-201(26), 2,803 cmt. For
a discussion of deemed revocation in the context of assisted suicide, see Jeffrey G. Sher-
man, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 803 (1993).
191 UPC § 2-803(e). The disclaimer provisions attempt to prevent a disclaimant
from manipulating the amount of a share passing to the disclaimant's descendants by
providing a substitute gift. See infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text; WAGGONER ET
AL., supra note 56, at 459 ("this means that the killer is treated as having predeceased
the decedent for purposes of allowing the killer's interest to pass to her or his surviving
descendants, if any, but not for purposes of changing the shares").
"I UPC § 2-803(c)(2).
197 Id. § 2-803(f). This provision, for example, might be intended to reach a case
where an individual procures the death of another in order to divert a gift to the natural
objects of the killer's bounty. See WAGGONER E AL., supra note 56, at 459. On the other
hand, if the killer does not acquire property or an interest in property, the provision
might not apply.
'18 See UPC § 2-801(d). If the disclaimant is also the alternative taker, a disclaimer
of the primary disposition does not prevent the property from passing to the disclaimant
under the alternative disposition. See, e.g., Cook v. Dove, 203 N.E.2d 892 (IIl. 1965) (ap-
pointee disclaimed property passing under exercised power of appointment while ac-
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time of the transfer, the disclalmant's creditors normally cannot
reach the disclaimed interest. 99  Moreover, if the disclaimer
meets the independent requirements of applicable federal tax
law, the transaction is treated for federal tax purposes as if the
disclaimed interest passed directly from the testator or owner to
the ultimate recipient without passing through the disclaimant's
hands. 00
The common law of disclaimers has been largely superseded
by statutes which expand the range of interests that may be dis-
claimed and prescribe formal and procedural requirements for a
valid disclaimer. 01 As revised in 1990, the UPC's disclaimer
statute authorizes disclaimers of any interest that "devolves by
whatever means," including dispositions by intestacy, will or
other governing instrument.20 2 The 1990 UPC revisions retain
the formal requirements for a valid disclaimer essentially un-
changed. Generally, a signed writing describing the disclaimed
interest and the extent of the disclaimer must be delivered or
. cepting same property as taker in default). Since an heir could not disclaim an intestate
share at common law, a residuary devisee who was also an heir could not avoid receiving
at least a portion of a decedent's estate.
"' For purposes of creditors' rights, the effect of the disclaimer is analogous to a
release by a donee of a presently-exercisable general power of appointment created by a
third party. See REsTATEMtENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Donative Transfers) §§ 13.2, 14.1
(1984). Nevertheless, under the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, disclaimed property may be
included in the disclaimant's bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1983); RzsrAT-
MENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Donative Transfers) § 13.6 (1934); see, e.g., Williams v.
Chenoweth (In re Chenoweth), 132 B.R. 161 (Bankr. S.D. IML 1991).
200 For federal gift, estate and generation-skipping tax purposes, a "qualified dis-
claimer" is defined in part by reference to state law and in part by independent federal
law. See LR.C. §§ 2518, 2046, 2654(c) (1988).
201 On the state law treatment of disclaimers generally, see AriNSON, supra note 12,
§ 139, at 774-76; RONALD BRAND & WILLIAM LAPIANA. DiscLimEns i ESTATE PLANNING
(1990); S. Alan Medlin, An Examination of Disclaimers Under U.P.C. Section 2.801, 55
ALE. L. REv. 1233 (1992).
202 UPC § 2-801(a). Unlike the original UPC, which was limited to interests passing
by testate or intestate succession or under an exercised testamentary power of appoint-
ment, see UPC § 2-801(a) (pre-1990), the revised statute embraces at least as broad a
range of interests as may be revoked by divorce or homicide. See infra note 206 and
accompanying text. The disclaimer statute is not limited to dispositions under a gov-
erning instrument, since it applies to interests passing by intestacy, but it is unclear
whether the statute authorizes disclaimers of beneficial interests created by a trust, con-
tract or gift that is not evidenced by a written instrument. The UPC drafters should
consider revising the statute to authorize a disclaimer by a fiduciary of administrative
powers that may affect the amount or character of a beneficiary's interest; such a provi-
sion could authorize a trustee to disclaim powers that might otherwise jeopardize a mari-
tal or charitable deduction for federal gift or estate tax purposes.
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filed no later than the expiration of a nine-month disclaimer pe-
riod, subject to earlier waiver or termination. 3 Although a dis-
claimer that meets the requirements of the UPC relates back
"for all purposes" under state law,204 failure to satisfy applicable
federal tax requirements may produce unwelcome tax
consequences. 205
The revised UPC's disclaimer statute controls the disposi-
tion of interests forfeited by a former spouse or killer under the
statutes concerning divorce and homicide, as well as interests ac-
tually disclaimed.2 06 As applied to a revocable will substitute,
the disclaimer statute resembles the antilapse statute: the dis-
claimed interest normally passes to alternative or residuary tak-
ers, if any, under the governing instrument as if the disclaimant
predeceased the owner,20 7 subject to a saving clause which pre-
serves the right of the disclaimant's surviving descendants to
201 See UPC §§ 2-801(b), (c). The nine-month period generally runs from (1) the
death of the testator or owner in the case of a transfer of a present interest by will or
other governing instrument which remained revocable by the owner until death, or (2)
"the event determining that the taker of the property or interest is finally ascertained
and his [or her] interest is indefeasibly vested" in the case of a future interest. The
running of the nine-month period may be postponed in certain cases until the disclai-
mant learns of "the existence of the interest." See id. § 2-801(b)(1)-(2). The right to
disclaim may be barred before the end of the nine-month period by a transfer or encum-
brance, a written waiver, an acceptance of benefits or a judicial sale. See id. § 2-801(e).
204 See id. §§ 2-801(d)(1)-(2). In the case of a transfer under a nontestamentary in-
strument or contract, the disclaimer relates back to the "effective date" of the instru-
ment. Id. § 2-801(d)(2). The effective date of a revocable instrument is defined in the
context of the nine-month disclaimer period as "the date on which the maker no longer
has power to revoke it or to transfer to himself [or herself] or another the entire legal
and equitable ownership of the interest." Id. § 2-801(b)(2). The UPC should be revised
to clarify the effective date of a governing instrument under which (1) the owner retains
a non-general power of appointment, (2) the owner retains a power of appointment exer-
cisable under limited conditions or with the consent of another person, or (3) the owner
may be unable by reason of incapacity to exercise a retained power of appointment.
"I2 A disclaimer that is valid under the UPC may fail to satisfy the federal tax law
requirements for a "qualified disclaimer" in several ways, for example: (1) the disclaimer
may be untimely, see I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2)(A) (1988); (2) the disclaimed interest may im-
permissibly pass to the disclaimant under an alternative or residuary disposition or by
intestate succession, see id. § 2518(b)(4)(B); Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(e)(5), Example 1;
(3) the disclaimant may retain an impermissible interest or power with respect'to dis-
claimed property, see Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-3(d), Examples 2, 9. Conversely, a disclaimer
that is untimely under state law may nevertheless be treated as a qualified disclaimer for
federal tax purposes under certain circumstances. See I.R.C. § 2518(c)(3) (1988).
... See UPC §§ 2-803(c)(1), 2-804(d).
20I If the owner's absolute power of revocation terminated before death, the disclai-
mant would be treated as having predeceased the earlier "effective date" of the instru-
ment. Id. § 2-801(d)(2); see supra note 204.
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take by representation.2 °0 The official comment illustrates the
application of the saying clause in the case of an unmarried, in-
testate decedent (G) survived by one child (A), A's two children
and the only child of a predeceased child (B). A disclaims the
intestate share. The official comment explains that, but for the
saving clause, A's disclaimed interest-one half of the es-
tate-would be divided equally between G's three grandchildren;
the saving clause preserves the disclaimed interest solely for A's
children.20 9 Even in the absence of a saving clause, it should be
clear that the general rule treating a disclaimant as predeceased
should not affect the devolution of interests that are not dis-
claimed. Thus, B's child should take half of G's estate by intes-
tate succession whether or not A disclaims.210
The UPC's treatment of disclaimers of interests in joint ten-
ancy property requires reworking. The statute permits a surviv-
ing joint tenant to disclaim at least the accretive portion of the
underlying property devolving by right of survivorship (mea-
sured by reference to the share of the deceased joint tenant im-
mediately before death). Moreover, the surviving joint tenant
may disclaim the "entire interest" if the joint tenancy was cre-
ated by a deceased joint tenant and the survivor neither joined
in its creation nor accepted a benefit under it.2"1 For example,
assume that A furnishes all the consideration for property ac-
quired in the names of A and B as joint tenants with right of
survivorship, and that B neither joins in creating the joint ten-
ancy nor accepts a benefit under it. If the joint tenancy remains
unsevered at A's death, the statute might view B (the surviving
'0 See id. § 2-801(d)(2). A technical amendment proposed in 1993 reformulates the
saving clause to provide that "the disclaimed interest passes by representation to the
[surviving] descendants of the disclaimant" if under applicable law or the governing in-
strument "the descendants of the discliimant would share in the disclaimed interest by
representation or otherwise were the disclaimant [predeceased]."
109 See id. § 2-801 cnt. The same approach should apply if A has one child (instead
of two) and B left two children (instead of one). In each case, the saving clause is in-
tended to treat A as predeceased "for purposes of allowing [A's] interest to pass to [A's]
surviving descendants, if any, but not for purposes of changing the shares." WAGGosN,
Er Al. supra note 56, at 459.
210 But see Estate of Bryant, 196 Cal. Rptr. 856 (CaL Ct. App. 1983); Medlin, supra
note 201, at 1261-62 n.162 (suggesting that the official comment "fails to address accu-
rately the danger that A can disclaim and appropriate some of B's share through an
ingenious manipulation of the UPC's rules for representation").
211 See UPC § 2-801(b)(3); see also UsNt. DSCLMAMER or TnsFRs UNDERa No.'rms-
TAMENTARY INsTmwuars AcT (1978), § 1 cmt., 8A U.LA. 112, 113-14.
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joint tenant) either as receiving half the property at the creation
of the joint tenancy and the other half at A's death (a two-stage
transfer), or as receiving the entire property at A's death (a sin-
gle-stage transfer). 12 The timing and extent of B's right to dis-
claim should be determined accordingly, as should the disposi-
tion of the disclaimed interest.1 The statute, however, appears
to treat the transaction as a single-stage transfer if B survives A
but as a two-stage transfer if A survives B.21 4 In other contexts,
the UPC treats an arrangement that operates as a single-stage
deathtime transfer as a revocable transfer and excludes it from
the operation of provisions concerning property held as joint te-
nants with right of survivorship.2 1 5 The same approach in the
disclaimer context would dispel much of the ambiguity of the
provisions concerning joint-tenancy property and would make
the statute more consistent with the rest of the UPC.216
212 Both views reject the highly formalistic common-law view that B receives no ad-
ditional interest at A's death but merely retains a preexisting undivided interest free of
A's expired rights.
213 The statute does not prescribe a separate disclaimer period with respect to joint-
tenancy property. If the time limit for disclaiming an interest devolving under a nontes-
tamentary instrument also applies to an interest devolving by right of survivorship, the
disclaimed interest must be classified as a present interest or a future interest. See UPC
§ 2-801(b)(2).
The statute also does not prescribe a separate disposition for an interest disclaimed
by a surviving joint tenant. The provisions governing the disposition of an interest de-
volving under a nontestamentary instrument, if applicable, treat the surviving joint ten-
ant as predeceased. See id. § 2-801(d)(2). Presumably, the disclaimed interest should
become part of the deceased joint tenant's probate estate.
214 If B survives A, B may disclaim the entire property which is treated as passing to
B in a single transfer at A's death. If A survives B, A may disclaim the undivided half
interest which is treated as being transferred to B at the creation of the joint tenancy
and retransferred to A by right of survivorship.
215 The UPC's definition of property held as "joint tenants with right of survivor-
ship" specifically includes a tenancy by the entirety but excludes a co-ownership ar-
rangement-such as a multiple-party account with right of survivorship-in which own-
ership is proportional to net contributions. See id. § 1-201(26). The distinction is
reflected, for example, in the constructional rules concerning the effect of homicide and
divorce. See id. §§ 2-803(c) (slayer statute providing for revocation of revocable transfer,
severance of joint tenancy with right of survivorship), 2-804(b) (revocation-by-divorce
statute providing similar treatment).
216 The official comment acknowledges that even after the 1990 UPC revisions, "the
Joint Editorial Board believes that this and the other Uniform Disclaimer Acts are in
need of revision." Id. § 2-801 cmt.
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III. PROTECTION OF PAYORS AND CREDITORS
As a practical matter, the success of any will substitute de-
pends on its ability to transfer property at the owner's death
more promptly and efficiently than the probate system. If the
payors who administer will substitutes were strictly liable for er-
roneous payments or .transfers, the costs of administering will
substitutes would increase dramatically. Similarly, if transfers of
nonprobate assets could not be implemented until the rights of
the decedent's creditors and surviving spouse were finally deter-
mined under the probate system, will substitutes would soon
lose their comparative advantage over the probate system. The
UPC attempts to resolve the questions of payor liability and sur-
viving spouse's rights by shifting both the benefits and the bur-
dens of probate avoidance to the interested beneficiaries. The
UPC leaves largely unaddressed controversial questions concern-
ing the availability of nonprobate assets to satisfy expenses of
administration and claims of a deceased owner's creditors. The
provisions concerning multiple-person accounts, however, sug-
gest a workable basis for a generalized statutory solution.
A. Protection of Payors
Several UPC rules attempt to avoid awkward or unexpected
dispositive consequences by implying provisions that substan-
tially modify or qualify the literal terms of a will or other gov-
erning instrument. The UPC's statutory remedies for poor draft-
ing should ultimately produce sensible results in accordance
with presumed dispositive intent while reducing pointless litiga-
tion concerning gaps and ambiguities in governing instruments.
At the same time, the UPC rules increase the risk that the pre-
scribed dispositive results may depart from the literal terms of
the governing instrument. To give effect to the intended disposi-
tion without creating undue administrative burdens, the UPC
separates the question of beneficial rights from that of payor lia-
bility. The UPC also grants broad protection to financial institu-
tions, registering entities and other payors that pay money or
transfer property in accordance with the literal terms of a gov-
erning instrument.
The provisions governing multiple-person accounts in finan-
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cial institutions clearly reflect this bifurcated approach.217 The
UPC expressly discharges a financial institution from "all
claims" for amounts paid "in accordance with the type of ac-
count ...whether or not the payment is consistent with the
beneficial ownership of the account as between parties, benefi-
ciaries, or their successors.""" Thus, a financial institution may
pay amounts on deposit in a multiple-party account with right
of survivorship at any time to any party, even though another
party may be entitled to recover the withdrawn amount from
the withdrawing party. 19 A financial institution may even be
discharged by a payment that ultimately turns out to have been
erroneous. For example, in the case of a single-party account
with a POD designation, if the party and the POD beneficiary
are both dead and the death certificates indicate-incorrectly, as
it turns out-that the POD beneficiary survived the party, a fi-
nancial institution should be protected in paying the account
balance to the successors of the POD beneficiary.220 The statu-
tory protection does not apply, however, to payments made after
receipt of written notice objecting to further payments.221 A fi-
nancial institution that receives such a written notice 6r "has
other reason to believe that a dispute exists" concerning benefi-
cial rights may with impunity refuse to make payments in accor-
dance with the terms of the account.2 22 Presumably, the finan-
cial institution may remit the disputed amount either to a
proper court in an interpleader proceeding or to a party who fur-
nishes appropriate indemnification.
21 See UPC §§ 6-206 (distinguishing subpart 2 concerning beneficial rights from
subpart 3 concerning liability of financial institutions), 6-226(d) (distinguishing benefi-
cial rights from liability of financial institution).
218 Id. § 6-226(a). Similarly, a registering entity that registers a transfer of a secur-
ity in accordance with a TOD registration in good faith is discharged from all claims to
the security. Id. § 6-308(c).
219 See id. § 6-222(1) (authorized payment); cf. id. §§ 6-211(b) (ownership during
life), 6-212(a) (rights at death).
220 See id. §§ 6-223(3) (authorized payment), 6-226 (discharge of liability); id § 1-
107 (proof of death); cf. id. § 6-308(c) (good-faith reliance on available information).
221 See id. § 6-2261b). To terminate statutory protection of the financial institution,
the notice must be received in the appropriate office, see id. § 6-201(9), from a party (or
a deceased party's representative or successor), see id. § 6-226(b), and must afford the
financial institution "reasonable opportunity to act." Id.; cf. id. § 6-308(c) (protection of
registering entity suspended by written notice of objection from "claimant to any inter-
est in the security").
222 See id. § 6-226(c).
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The 1990 UPC revisions extend similar protection to payors
and third parties specifically with respect to the statutory rules
concerning 120-hour survival, substituted takers and deemed
revocation on homicide or divorce. The UPC expressly protects a
payor or other third party from liability for paying money or
transferring property to a person who would have been entitled
to the money or property under the terms of the governing in-
strument but for the application of one of the specified statutory
rules, in the absence of written notice that the payment or trans-
fer is or may be improper. 2 A payor or third party who has
received such written notice is liable for any subsequent pay-
ment or transfer that turns out to be improper by reason of one
of the specified statutory rules, but is protected in remitting the
disputed money or property to a proper court.224
In effect, these protective provisions relieve payors from re-
sponsibility for independently investigating or determining cer-
tain facts-nonsurvival, homicide or divorce-that may affect
beneficial interests under a governing instrument. The separa-
tion of payor liability from beneficial rights strikes a balance be-
tween the payor's interest in prompt and efficient administra-
tion and the rival claimants' interest in accurate resolution of
disputes concerning beneficial rights. As a technical matter, the
UPC drafters should consider consolidating the statutory pro-
tection for financial institutions, registering entities and other
payors into a single provision. Such a provision might clarify the
source, content and timing of a written notice suspending pro-
tection 2 It might also authorize a payor who has received writ-
ten notice to proceed with a proposed payment or transfer un-
123 See id. §§ 2-702(e)(1) (120-hour survival), 2-706(d)(1) (substitute takers), 2-
803(h)(1) (homicide), 2-804(g)(1) (divorce). The UPC also extends protection to other
acts performed in good-faith reliance on the terms of the governing instrument. A few
states offer similar protection in the case of a trust or other nonprobate transfer. See
ScoTT, supra note 13, § 226, at 423-24 n.7 (trustee protection); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 461.067(4) (1986 & Supp. 1992) (payor protection).
11 See UPC §§ 2-702(e)(1)-(2) (120-hour survival), 2-706(d)(1)-(2) (substitute tak-
ers), 2-803(h)(1)-(2) (homicide), 2-804(g)(1)-(2) (divorce).
222 For example, the statute should probably require that a notice (1) identify the
governing instrument and property in question, (2) originate from a person claiming a
beneficial interest, and (3) afford the payor a reasonable opportunity to act. See id. §§ 6-
226(b), 6-308(c), 2-702(e)(1), 2-706(d)(1), 2-803(h)(1), 2-804(g)(1); Cf. Umip. Acr FOR S .a-
PLIFICATION OF FIDUCIARY SECURrrY TRANSFERS (1958), § 5, 7B U.L.A. 689, 699.
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less an adverse claimant promptly obtains a restraining order.220
Furthermore, a consolidated provision would eliminate potential
conflicts between the existing UPC provisions discharging a fi-
nancial institution or registering entity from liability and those
imposing liability on payors generally. 27 Finally, a consolidated
provision should protect a payor who has no notice of a dis-
claimer and makes a payment or transfer that would be proper
but for the disclaimer.
In relieving a payor of responsibility for ascertaining the
proper recipient of a payment or transfer, the UPC's protective
provisions relax the traditional standard of liability for a per-
sonal representative or trustee.228 It seems anomalous that a fi-
duciary's duty of inquiry in making distributions should depend
on the particular statutory source of the beneficiary's right. For
example, assume that a revocable trust agreement provides for
payments of net income to the settlor's named spouse until
death or remarriage and that the settlor dies shortly after be-
coming divorced from the spouse. Apparently, the trustee may
distribute net income to the former spouse with impunity until
226 The statute might provide that after receipt of a proper notice of objection from
a claimant, a payor is nevertheless discharged from liability for making a payment or
transfer to a designated beneficiary in accordance with the terms of a governing instru-
ment, if (1) the payment or transfer occurs at least 30 days after the payor gives written
notice thereof to the claimant, and (2) no judicial order restraining the payment or trans-
fer is entered within the 30-day period. Such a provision would permit a claimant to
block a deathtime transfer for up to 30 days, and would shift the burden of initiating
judicial proceedings to the claimant. Cf. UNIF. ACT FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF FIDUCIARY SE-
CURITY TRANSFERS (1958), § 5, 7B U.L.A. 689, 699; U.C.C. § 8-403 (1989); see also Well-
man, supra note 11, at 823.
'127 Assume, for example, that the sole POD beneficiary on a single-party bank ac-
count murders the party, that the bank receives notice of the murder by an anonymous
letter delivered the next morning to the bank's main office by registered mail, and that
within minutes after delivery of the letter the POD beneficiary requests and receives
payment of the account balance. The letter may constitute written notice sufficient to
deprive the bank of protection under the provision concerning homicide, see UPC § 2-
803(h)(1) (liability for payment after written notice), but not under the provision con-
cerning financial institution protection, see id. § 6-226(a), (b) (payment in accordance
with multiple-person provisions and type of account, absent notice and reasonable op-
portunity to act). Moreover, it remains unclear whether the POD beneficiary becomes
even presumptively entitled to the account until 120 hours after the party's death. See
id. § 2-702(e)(1) (payor protected in relying on beneficiary's "apparent entitlement
under the terms of the governing instrument").
28 See id. § 3-703 (personal representative protected for distribution "authorized at
the time"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 226 (1957) (trustee liable for unautho-
rized distribution).
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receiving written notice of the divorce,220 but may incur liability
for continuing to make distributions after the former spouse re-
marries even if the trustee lacks notice of the remarriage. 230 Sim-
ilarly, a personal representative may enjoy statutory protection
in failing to inquire whether a devisee has survived a deceased
testator by 120 hours,231 but may incur liability for failing to in-
quire whether the antilapse statute prescribes a substitute
gift.232 A consolidated provision protecting payors should clarify
the extent to which it modifies the traditional standard for a
trustee or personal representative.
Although a payor may be protected from liability for a pay-
ment or transfer that turns out to be improper under specified
statutory rules, the UPC imposes liability on the recipient-or
any transferee other than a bona fide purchaser-to restore the
money or property or its value to the rightful beneficiary. 3
These provisions, which mirror the UPC's treatment of im-
proper distributions from a probate estate,234 approximate the
remedy of a constructive trust.2 33
2' See UPC § 2-804(b)(1), (g)(1). If the trust became irrevocable more than nine
months before the divorce, a problem might arise in determining the effect of the di-
vorce. See id. §§ 2-804(d) (deemed disclaimer), 2-801(b)(2) (limited disclaimer period
following effective date of nontestamentary instrument), 2-801(d)(2) (disposition of dis-
claimed interest as if disclaimant predeceased effective date of nontestamentary
instrument).
2° See National Academy of Sciences v. Cambridge Trust Co., 346 N.E.2d 879
(Mass. 1976) (trustee liable for improper distributions).
231 See UPC § 2-702(e)(1). The protective provisions apply to payors and other
third parties who rely on the terms of a governing instrument. A "governing instrument"
clearly includes a will, and the term "payor" apparently includes a personal representa-
tive. See id. §§ 1-201(19) ("governing instrument" includes will), 1-201(34) ("payor" in-
cludes any person authorized or obligated by law or governing instrument to make
payments).
2 See id. §§ 2-603 (antilapse statute for wills), 3-703 (fiduciary standard of care;
duty to distribute estate in accordance with terms of will; protection for distribution
"authorized at the time"). The antilapse statute applicable to vills contains no payor-
protection provisions.
2 See id. §§ 2-702(0(1) (120-hour survival), 2-706(e)(1) (substitute takers), 2-
803(i)(1) (homicide), 2-804(h)(1) (divorce).
2' See id. §§ 3-909 (liability of recipient to restore improper payment or distribu-
tion from probate estate), 3-910 (protection of purchasers).
"1 The UPC also uses the constructive trust analogy in an attempt to neutralize the
possibility of preemption with respect to employee benefit plans covered by ERISA. See
ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (preempting any state laws that "relate to"
covered employee benefit plans). Compare Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hanslip, 939
F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1991) (slayer statute preempted) with New Orleans Elec. Pension
Fund v. DeRocha, 779 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. La. 1991) (slayer statute not preempted);
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B. Family Protection
The UPC offers protection against disinheritance to a dece-
dent's surviving spouse and children. In the case of a surviving
spouse, a statutory elective share has superseded common-law
dower and curtesy in most separate-property states. The stat-
utes, however, reflect divergent approaches to nonprobate assets
in measuring and satisfying the elective share.236 Statutes that
simply authorize the surviving spouse to elect a share equal to a
fixed portion of the decedent's estate, if interpreted literally,
permit ready avoidance of the elective share by means of a
funded revocable trust2 37 or other will substitute. 23 8 On the other
hand, judicial attempts to determine whether a disposition is
"fraudulent" or "illusory" have failed to reduce litigation or pro-
duce predictable results.2 39
The UPC's elective-share provision expressly takes account
of most will substitutes in determining the amount and source of
Mendez-Bellido v. Board of Trustees, 709 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (same). The
UPC provides that if specified dispositive rules are preempted, the recipient of a pay-
ment or transfer is liable to restore the money or property received, or its value, to the
person who would have been entitled to receive it in the absence of preemption. See
UPC §§ 2-702(f)(2) (120-hour survival), 2-706(e)(2) (substitute takers), 2-803(i)(2)
(homicide), 2-804(h)(2) (divorce). These provisions may be defended as "respect[ing
ERISA's concern that federal law govern the administration of the plan, while still
preventing unjust enrichment that would result if an unintended beneficiary were to re-
ceive the pension benefits." Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 55, at 1127; see also UPC
§ 2-804 cmt.
236 A statutory elective share is largely unnecessary in community-property states
because each spouse generally enjoys present ownership rights in property acquired dur-
ing the marriage (other than by donative transfer). If one spouse earns a disproportion-
ate share of the marital property in a separate-property state and dies domiciled in a
community-property state, however, the rights of the surviving spouse may be drastically
curtailed unless the latter state recognizes the concept of quasi-community property. See
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 191, at 419-20; WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 56, at
469-70.
23' See, e.g., Kerwin v. Donaghy, 59 N.E.2d 299 (Mass. 1945) (subsequently over-
ruled); Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 179 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio 1961); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57 cmt. c (1957).
238 See, e.g., Toman v. Svoboda, 349 N.E.2d 668 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (joint stock);
Snodgrass v. Lyndon State Bank, 811 P.2d 58 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (POD account).
"I' See, e.g., Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937) (revocable trust
illusory); Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 54 N.E.2d 75 (111. App. Ct. 1944) (revocable trust
illusory); In re Halpern's Estate, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951) (tentative savings
account trust not illusory); Johnson v. LaGrange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185 (Ill. 1978)
(revocable trust and joint account not illusory). One court has rejected the.illusory-trans-
fer test as "unsatisfactory." Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. 1984).
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the elective share, independently of their validity for dispositive
purposes.2 0 For example, in the base for measuring the elective
share the UPC includes property over which the decedent re-
tained a general power of appointment or a power to revoke, as
well as life insurance proceeds and the decedent's share of prop-
erty passing by right of survivorship.24" To minimize the disrup-
tion of these dispositions, however, the UPC provides for satis-
faction of the elective share first from property passing to or
owned by the surviving spouse.24 2 The 1990 UPC revisions
reformulate the elective share to reflect a "partnership theory of
marriage ' 243 which maintains the original UPC's fully integrated
approach to the surviving spouse's elective share in probate and
nonprobate assets.
The UPC also provides limited protection against inadver-
tent disinheritance of a testator's surviving spouse under a will
executed before the marriage by granting the spouse a modified
intestate share of the probate estate.44 An analogous provision
protects children of the testator who were born or adopted after
the execution of the will. 245 These protective provisions are in-
tended to cure inadvertent disinheritance; they do not apply if
the testator intentionally omits a spouse or child from the
will. 2 46 Similarly, they do not apply if the testator makes a trans-
240 See UPC §§ 2-202(b)(2) (amount), 2-207(b)-(c) (source). Treating will substi-
tutes as "testamentary" solely for elective share purposes should pose no conceptual ob-
stacle. See Browder, supra note 11, at 883-86; Effland, supra note 33, at 434-35.
2,1 See UPC §§ 2-202(b)(2). The 1990 UPC revisions expand the scope of the aug-
mented estate to include property subject to a power released or exercised by the dece-
dent within two years before death and life insurance proceeds payable to a beneficiary
other than the surviving spouse. Cf. UPC §§ 2-202(1)(ii), 2-202(1) (flush language) (pre-
1990).
242 See UPC § 2-207(a).
243 Id. art. 2, part 2, general cmt.; see John H. Langbein & Lavrence W. Waggoner,
Redesigning the Spouse's Forced Share, 22 RAL PROP, PRO. & Ta. J 303 (1987); Law-
rence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under the Re-
vised Uniform Probate Code, 76 IoWA L Rav. 223 (1990).
244 See UPC § 2-301. The 1990 UPC revisions reformulate this provision to take
account of devises in a premarital will to the surviving spouse or to certain children of
the testator. The effect of transfers outside the will, however, remains unchanged.
2,I See id. § 2-302. The 1990 UPC revisions reformulate this provision to put the
omitted child as nearly as possible on an equal footing with existing children provided
for in the will. The effect of transfers outside the will, however, remains unchanged.
246 See id. §§ 2-301(a)(1)-(3), 2-302(b). Thus, the omitted-spouse provision serves a
different purpose from the elective share, which applies regardless of the testator's in-
tent. See id. § 2-201.
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fer outside the will that is intended to take the place of a testa-
mentary provision for the spouse or child.24 7 The provisions pro-
tecting an omitted spouse or child apply only to probate assets
and operate essentially as constructional rules for wills: they
take will substitutes into account solely for the purpose of deter-
mining whether a testator's failure to provide for a spouse or
child in the will was intentional. 4 s In interpreting a will, which
normally disposes of a decedent's residual property, it makes
sense to inquire into the testator's overall dispositive plan.24" 9 By
contrast, the same inquiry with respect to each separate will
substitute makes no sense as a practical matter.2 "0 The UPC
properly does not attempt to extend the provisions protecting an
omitted spouse or child beyond the will context.
C. Protection of Creditors
By limiting payor liability, the UPC permits beneficiaries to
resolve uncertainties and disputes concerning their respective
rights without unduly hindering the efficient administration of
will substitutes in routine cases. The determination of beneficial
rights, however, may be considerably complicated by claims of
2M See id. §§ 2-301(a)(1)-3), 2-302(b); see, e.g., In re Estate of Aspenson, 470
N.W.2d 692 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (joint accounts, life insurance and retirement ac-
count); In re Estate of Taggart, 619 P.2d 562 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (joint account and
retirement account); In re Estate of Frandson, 356 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1984) (joint ten-
ancy property); In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989) (gifts).
248 See In re Estate of Cayo, 342 N.W.2d 785 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (settlor failed to
provide in revocable trust for afterborn child; omitted-child provision inapplicable to
trust property).
249 Accordingly, several of the UPC's constructional rules apply only to wills. See,
e.g., UPC §§ 2-602 (after-acquired property), 2-604 (failed devises), 2-608 (exercise of
general testamentary power of appointment), 2-609 (satisfaction).
1o0 In principle, it may be desirable to extend uniform protection to an omitted
spouse or child with respect to nonprobate and probate assets. See McGovern, supra
note 52, at 1345; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Donative Transfers) § 34.2(2)
(1990). As a practical matter, however, such protection raises severe difficulties. See id.
cmt. g (protection should apply to will substitute providing "comprehensive post-death
dispositive plan" but not to will substitute disposing of single item). For an awkward
attempt to extend omitted-child protection to nonprobate transfers, see Mo, REV. STAT.
§ 461.059 (1986 & Supp. 1992) (child born to or adopted by owner subsequent to benefi-
ciary designation takes "equal share of any property transferable to the owner's children
under the beneficiary designation"). Under this provision, if an owner, married with two
children, names each child as sole beneficiary under a separate will substitute and then
dies after the birth of a third child, the afterborn child apparently takes half of each will
substitute; the disparity would be even more pronounced if there were additional
afterborn children.
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the deceased owner's creditors. In the absence of an applicable
statute, it is often unclear to what extent or by what means a
decedent's creditors may reach particular nonprobate assets.
Not surprisingly, courts have taken divergent approaches and
reached conflicting results.25' Although the UPC currently ad-
dresses the problem only in the limited context of multiple-per-
son accounts, the same approach lends itself to broader
application.
1. Will Substitutes as Asset Shelters
The ability of a deceased owner's creditors to reach the
owner's nonexempt property 52 depends in large part on whether
the owner disposed of the property by will or by will substitute.
In the case of probate assets, the probate system preserves the
rights of a deceased owner's unsecured creditors more or less as
they existed immediately before death, subject to two important
restrictions. First, the owner's death gives rise to statutory al-
lowances, expenses of administration and other claims payable
from the probate estate that automatically take priority over
preexisting debts. 53 If the owner was only marginally solvent
immediately before death, the estate may become insolvent as a
result of expenses arising at or after death, leaving unsecured
creditors to bear their share of the loss. Second, the probate sys-
" On creditors' rights in nonprobate assets generally, see Thomas R. Andrews,
Creditors' Rights Against Nonprobate Assets in Washington: Time for Reform, 65
WASH. L. Rv. 73 (1990); Effland, supra note 33.
22 Certain property, such as a homestead, life insurance proceeds, or employee ben-
efits under a qualified plan, may be wholly or partially exempt from creditors' claims
both during life and after death. See UPC § 2-402 (1990) (homestead); CoucH, supra
note 14, §§ 29:114, :118-19, 25, at 411-18, 424-27, 434 (life insurance); ERISA § 206(d),
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1988 & Supp. 1I 1991) (employee benefits). These exemptions are
often coupled with restrictions on disposition which reflect an underlying policy of pro-
tecting specific assets or family members. See Andrews, supra note 2.51, at 103-12; Eff-
land, supra note 33, at 446-48.
2" The UPC provides statutory allowances for homestead, exempt property and
family support, which take priority over all claims. See UPC §§ 2-402 (homestead), 2-
403 (exempt property), 2-404 (family support). The UPC also classifies claims in order of
priority for payment, ranging from expenses of administration to claims having no pref-
erence under state or federal law. See id. § 3-805 (priority of claims). Although the UPC
excludes death taxes from the definition of claims, see id. § 1-201(6), such taxes are
normally payable in the first instance from the probate estate, see I.R.C. §§ 2002, 2203,
2205 (1988), even if the ultimate burden is apportioned by will or statute, see UPC § 3-
916 (death tax apportionment).
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tem imposes procedural restrictions, including an automatic bar
on reaching probate assets to satisfy any claim that arose before
death unless the claim is presented within prescribed time
limits. 254
By comparison with the statutory procedure for collecting
debts from uncooperative living debtors, 5 the UPC's claims
procedure appears simple and orderly, but it may still impose
unnecessary delays and administrative burdens on creditors
seeking to collect undisputed claims. It is hardly surprising,
therefore, that many creditors prefer to use more efficient pri-
vate collection arrangements-security agreements, credit insur-
ance or third-party guarantees-rather than statutory collection
procedures. 256 Nevertheless, the statutory collection procedures
serve several essential functions: they represent the only practi-
cal remedy for creditors who lack the sophistication or opportu-
nity to obtain alternative protection;257 they provide a means of
resolving disputed claims; and they indirectly reinforce the ne-
gotiating position of creditors who rely primarily on voluntary
out-of-court settlements.2 85 The probate claims procedure ap-
plies only to probate assets and neither extends nor limits credi-
tors' rights in nonprobate assets.259
2' Under the UPC, for example, a claim arising before death may be presented, if
not otherwise barred, up to the later of four months after published notice to creditors or
60 days after mailed notice, or in the absence of notice up to one year after death. Claims
arising at or after death (e.g., administrative expenses) are subject to separate time lim-
its. See UPC §§ 3-801, 3-803. The personal representative may disallow a claim up to 60
days after presentation, and the creditor may seek an adjudication of the claim within 60
days after disallowance. See id. §§ 3-804, 3-806. A personal representative who fails to
observe the respective rights of creditors and beneficiaries may incur personal liability.
See id. §§ 3-703, 3-805, 3-807. Accordingly, distribution of the bulk of the probate estate
is unlikely to occur before the expiration of the period for presenting claims.
." An unsecured creditor may be deterred from pursuing even a clearly meritorious
claim against a living debtor under the statutory collection process; after obtaining a
money judgment, the creditor may be forced to expend additional time and resources
searching for non-exempt property of sufficient value to satisfy the judgment after ex-
penses of execution, levy and sale. By contrast, the probate system shifts responsibility
for collecting assets and paying claims in the statutory order of priority to the personal
representative.
256 See Effiand, supra note 33, at 431-32; Langbein, supra note 1, at 1120-23.
257 Individual creditors-for example, a divorced spouse or a child asserting rights
under a property settlement or support agreement, or a personal injury claimant-may
lack access to alternative arrangements. See Effiland, supra note 33, at 432-33.
" Langbein, supra note 1, at 1124.
259 Under the UPC, a claim that is not timely presented is "barred against the es-
tate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent." UPC § 3-
[Vol. 58: 1123
WILL SUBSTITUTES
In the absence of an applicable statute, the law concerning
creditors' rights in nonprobate assets remains fragmented and
underdeveloped. The determination that a particular will substi-
tute is "nontestamentary"-effective to dispose of the underly-
ing property-does not necessarily put the property beyond the
reach of the owner's creditors at death. 260 For example, conven-
tional doctrine permits the settlor of a revocable trust to achieve
dispositive results practically equivalent to a specific devise
while sharply limiting the ability of the settlor's creditors to
reach the trust property. During the settlor's life, it is true, the
creditors may reach any beneficial interest retained by the set-
tlor (regardless of spendthrift restrictions), as well as the maxi-
mum amount that the trustee could distribute for the settlor's
benefit under a discretionary trust.261 Moreover, some statutes
simply treat a revocable trust as void from inception with re-
spect to claims of the settlor's creditors.6 2 In the absence of an
applicable statute, however, the conventional distinction be-
tween a general power of appointment and a power of revocation
may permit a settlor who retains an income interest for life cou-
pled with a power of revocation to shield the trust property
(though not the retained income interest) from creditors'
claims.263 Even under a statute that permits a court to compel
803. The UPC includes no comparable provision concerning nonprobate assets. See An.
drews, supra note 251, at 83-87; Effland, supra note 33, at 435.
260 Of course, if a will substitute is branded as "testamentary," the attempted dispo-
sition fails and the underlying property is available both before and after the owner's
death to satisfy creditors' claims.
211 See, e.g., Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 27 A.2d 166 (Conn. 1942); Ware v.
Gulda, 117 N.E.2d 137 (Mass. 1954); see REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tusrs § 156 (1957);
Scorr, supra note 13, § 156, at 168 n.5 (collecting statutes).
262 See Scorr, supra note 13, § 330.12, at 375 n.8 (collecting statutes); see also
Johnson v. Johnson, 645 P.2d 911 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) (treating power of revocation as
retained beneficial interest under statute declaring trusts for settlor's use void against
settlor's creditors).
26 The statement in text assumes that the creation of the trust is not fraudulent as
to the settlor's creditors and that the power of revocation remains unexercised. See, e.g.,
Murphey v. C.I.T. Corp., 33 A.2d 16 (Pa. 1943); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRusTs
§ 330, cmt. o (1957). By contrast, conventional doctrine permits the settlor's creditors to
reach the trust property during the settlor's life and after death if the settlor retains a
life income interest coupled with a general power of appointment over the remainder,
even if the power of appointment remains unexercised. See RESTAr MENr OF PROPzRT
§ 328 (1940); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156, cmt. c (1957); RFsrATzFZ-,,Ar
(SEcoND) OF PROPERTY (Donative Transfers) § 13.3 (1984). But ef. Fidelity Trust Co. v.
New York Fin. Co., 125 F. 275 (3d Cir. 1903) (unexercised testamentary general power of
appointment).
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the exercise of a retained power of revocation for the benefit of
the settlor's creditors, the termination of the power at death
may defeat the claims of creditors who failed to act during the
settlor's life.264
The technical distinction between a general power of ap-
pointment and a power of revocation appears to be eroding.266
Courts that reject the distinction have readily subjected revoca-
ble trust property to claims of the settlor's creditors after death
as well as during life, at least if the settlor's other property is
insufficient to pay all claims.26 This approach affords creditors
essentially the same access to revocable trust property as they
would have to property disposed of by a savings account trust,
2 7
an exercised testamentary general power of appointment 2 8 or a
"4 See, e.g., Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 21 N.E.2d 119 (Ohio 1939).
2" See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Reiser, 389 N.E.2d 768, 771 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1979) ("same analysis and policy" applicable to power of revocation and general
power of appointment); Johnson v. Com'l Bank, 588 P.2d 1096, 1099 (Or. 1978) (power of
revocation "essentially the same as a general power of appointment"). Compare RE-
STATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 318(2) cmt. a (1940) (excluding power of revocation from defi-
nition of power of appointment) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Donative
Transfers) § 11.1 cmt. c (1984) (including power of revocation in definition of power of
appointment).
266 In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Reiser, 389 N.E.2d 768 (Mass. App. Ct.
1979), the settlor created an inter vivos trust, reserving a power to amend or revoke the
trust and the right during life to direct the disposition of principal and income. Subse-
quently, the settlor borrowed money from an unsecured creditor and died insolvent. The
court found the power of revocation substantially equivalent to a general power of ap-
pointment. It held that "where a person places property in trust and reserves the right to
amend and revoke, or to direct disposition of principal and income, the settlor's creditors
may, following the death of the settlor, reach in satisfaction of the settlor's debts to
them, to the extent not satisfied by the settlor's estate, those assets owned by the trust
over which the settlor had such control at the time of his death as would have enabled
the settlor to use the trust assets for his own benefit." Id. at 771; see also Johnson v.
Com'l Bank, 588 P.2d 1096 (Or. 1978) (revocable trust void against creditors under stat-
ute concerning self-settled trusts); In re Estate of Kovalyshyn, 343 A.2d 852 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1975) (analogy to savings account trust).
217 See Montgomery v. Michaels, 301 N.E.2d 465 (Ill. 1973); In re Reich's Estate,
146 Misc. 616, 262 N.Y.S. 623 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1933); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 58 cmt. d (1957). In In re Estate of Kovalyshyn, 343 A.2d 852 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975),
the court expressly relied on the similarity between a revocable trust of mutual funds
and a savings account trust.
288 The exercise of a testamentary general power of appointment by an insolvent
donee subjects the appointive assets to the donee's creditors regardless of whether the
power was created by the donee, see RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 328 (1940); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Donative Transfers) § 13.3 (1984), or by a third person,
see RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 329 (1940); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 13.4
(1984).
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gift causa mortis.2 69 Indeed, courts that permit creditors to reach
such property after exhausting probate assets might be viewed
as adopting an expanded common-law doctrine of abatement.7 0
The scope and priority of creditors' rights in revocable trust
property, as well as the procedure for asserting and resolving
claims, are more appropriately addressed by statute than by case
law.2 71
Outside the revocable trust context, courts appear less in-
clined to permit a decedent's creditors to reach nonprobate as-
sets. In several cases involving federal savings bonds registered
in joint-and-survivor or POD form, for example, courts have
held that the owner's interest terminates at death and defeats
the ability of creditors to reach the bonds even if the probate
estate is insolvent.27 2 Similarly, when one joint tenant dies sur-
vived by another, the decedent's interest in the joint tenancy
property simply terminates, defeating any rights the decedent's
creditors might have asserted against the property during life
and relegating them to the decedent's probate assets.273 These
269 See ATKINSON, supra note 12, § 116, at 639-40.
270 See In re Reich's Estate, 146 Misc. 616, 262 N.Y.S. 623 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1933)
(explicit analogy between savings account trust and specific devise); In re Walsh's Es-
tate, 23 Misc. 2d 873, 200 N.Y.S.2d 159 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1960) (ratable contributions from
multiple savings account trusts).
2" The pitfalls in drafting such a statute are graphically illustrated by a Missouri
statute that authorizes any trustee having a duty or power to pay a decedents debts to
start a six-month non-claim period running by publishing a notice to creditors, and bars
the enforcement of debts not presented to the trustee within the six-month period
against the trustee or the trust property. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.610 (1986 & Supp.
1992). Unfortunately, the statute fails to clarify (1) the procedure for presenting and
allowing claims, (2) the priority for payment of debts, and (3) the circumstances in which
creditors of a deceased settlor or beneficiary may reach trust property. See ABA Probate
and Trust Committee, Rights of Creditors to Reach Assets of a Rev'ocable Trust After
the Death of the Grantor-The Missouri Approach, 20 REAL Paop. Poa. & Tnusr J.
1189 (1985).
272 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Danko, 36 A.2d 420 (N.J. Ch. 1944) (POD bonds); Applica-
tion of Laundree, 277 A.D. 994, 100 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1950) (POD bonds); In re Estate of
Simon, 5 Misc. 2d 1018, 162 N.Y.S.2d 678 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1957) (joint.and.survivor
bonds); see also In re Walsh's Estate, 23 Misc. 2d 873, 200 N.Y.S.2d 159 (N.Y. Surr. Ct.
1960) (permitting insolvent decedent's creditors to reach savings account trust but not
joint-and-survivor bonds, joint bank accounts or a retirement account with designated
beneficiary).
27I See, e.g., Park State Bank v. McLean, 660 P.2d 13 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Rembe
v. Stewart, 387 N.W.2d 313 (Iowa 1986); Irvin L. Young Foundation, Inc. v. Damrell, 511
A.2d 1069 (Me. 1986); DeForge v. Patrick, 76 N.W. 2d 733 (Neb. 1936); In re Walsh's
Estate, 23 Misc. 2d 873, 200 N.Y.S.2d 159 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1960); Schlichenmayer v.
Luithle, 221 N.W.2d 77 (N.D. 1974); Ladd v. State of Oklahoma, ex rel. Oklahoma Tax
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results are logically consistent with, though certainly not com-
pelled by, the passing-of-an-interest analysis that courts origi-
nally developed to rationalize and validate will substitutes. 274 By
insisting that the probate system provides the exclusive proce-
dure not only for disposing of property at death but also for en-
forcing claims by a decedent's creditors, courts ignore the possi-
bility that a disposition may be "testamentary with respect to
creditors without being testamentary for all purposes. ' '275
One possible method of protecting the rights of a decedent's
creditors in nonprobate assets relies on the concept of a fraudu-
lent transfer at death. Under existing fraudulent-transfer stat-
utes, creditors of an insolvent debtor may generally reach prop-
erty transferred by the debtor for less than reasonably
equivalent value.276 In addition, the UPC grants a decedent's
personal representative exclusive authority to recover property
fraudulently transferred to the extent necessary to pay the dece-
dent's unsecured debts.277 If courts treated will substitutes as
deathtime transfers, these statutes might be applied to authorize
an insolvent decedent's personal representative to reach nonpro-
bate assets to the extent necessary to pay the decedent's un-
secured debts after exhausting probate assets.278
The main difficulty with this approach is that courts gener-
Comm'n, 688 P.2d 59 (Okla. 1984); see AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 149,
§ 6.1, at 6-7; Effland, supra note 33, at 435-38; Hines, More Law, supra note 18, at 545-
47. In a few states, statutes subject property passing to a surviving joint tenant to claims
of the decedent's creditors. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-14e (1992); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 41-2.2(c) (1984 & Supp. 1992) (corporate stock and investment securities); OKLA, STAT.
tit. 60, § 74 (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 30-21A-1 (1984); Wis. STAT. § 700.24 (1992).
274 See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
272 See Browder; supra note 11, at 883-86; see also Effland, supra note 33, at 434.
Courts occasionally recognize that a nonprobate transfer may be nontestamentary under
a validating statute yet subject to claims of the deceased owner's creditors. See, e.g.,
Russell v. Posey County Department of Public Welfare, 471 N.E.2d 1209 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984) (POD provision in contract for sale of land).
276 See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT (1918), 7A U.L.A. 427; UNIF. FRAUDU-
LENT TRANSFER ACT (1985), 7A U.L.A. 639.
27 See UPC § 3-710.
278 See Andrews, supra note 251, at 79-82; Effiland, supra note 33, at 441-42 (1983);
William M. McGovern, Jr., supra note 11, at 27; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY (Donative Transfers) § 34.3(3) (decedent's creditors should be able to reach
"any property included in an inter vivos donative transfer made by the decedent that is
a substitute for a will or that is revocable by the decedent at the time of the decedent's
death"), § 34.3, cmt. j (inference that claims should be satisfied from nonprobate assets
only after exhausting probate assets) (1990).
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ally analyze will substitutes as lifetime transfers and grant relief
under the fraudulent-transfer statutes only if the transfer was
fraudulent as to creditors when made. 79 Moreover, the fraudu-
lent-transfer statutes, even if applicable, provide for recovery of
property to the extent necessary to pay unsecured debts but not
expenses of administration, statutory allowances or other items
that take priority over distributions to heirs and devisees. Occa-
sionally, however, courts adopt a fraudulent-transfer analysis. In
In re Granwel1280 a husband, while solvent, purchased mutual
funds in the names of himself and his wife as joint tenants with
right of survivorship. He also contributed additional mutual
funds to a revocable trust naming his wife as remainder taker.
The husband died insolvent. The court treated the mutual funds
as fraudulently transferred at death to the extent of the hus-
band's retained lifetime control, i.e., one half of the jointly-
owned mutual funds and all of the mutual funds held in the rev-
ocable trust. "It would violate the spirit and purpose of... [the
fraudulent-transfer statute] to decide that the rights of his cred-
itors were extinguished when [the wife] succeeded to his interest
as the surviving joint tenant. ' '281
2. The UPC Right of Recovery (Multiple-Person
Accounts)
Although the UPC's blanket validating statute expressly
preserves creditors' rights in nonprobate assets, it neither cre-
ates such rights nor establishes a procedure for asserting
them.28 2 In the limited context of multiple-person accounts,
however, the UPC authorizes a deceased party's personal repre-
sentative to recover account balances passing to surviving par-
ties or POD beneficiaries to the extent needed to pay claims and
' See, e.g., Splaine v. Morrissey, 184 N.E. 670 (Mass. 1933) (joint bank account);
Casagranda v. Donahue, 585 P.2d 1286 (Mont. 1978) (joint bank account); Angier v.
Worrel, 31 A.2d 87 (Pa. 1943) (joint tenancy in land); Application of Laundree, 277 A.D.
994, 100 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1950) (POD bonds); In re Estate of Simon, 5 Misc. 2d 1018, 162
N.Y.S.2d 678 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1957) (joint bonds and POD bonds); Reynolds v. Danko, 36
A.2d 420 (N.J. Eq. 1944) (POD bonds).
0 20 N.Y.2d 91, 228 N.E.2d 779, 281 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1967).
"I Id. at 96, 228 N.E.2d at 782, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 787. The court in Kashan v. Kosoff,
112 A.D.2d 350, 491 N.Y.S.2d 801 (2d Dep't 1985), adopted the same approach to a joint
tenancy in land, citing Granwell.
282 See UPC §§ 6-101(b), 6-309(b); Effland, supra note 33, at 449.
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statutory allowances after exhausting probate assets; any
amounts so recovered are administered as part of the probate
estate.2 s3 Although this statutory framework may serve as a
model for a more comprehensive provision, attempts to extend it
to nonprobate assets generally will undoubtedly prove
controversial. 84
The UPC treats surviving parties and POD beneficiaries as
if they received a "special form of specific devise" that takes pri-
ority over all probate assets but remains subordinate to claims
and statutory allowances in the usual order of priority.28 The
recoverable amounts include statutory allowances, expenses of
administration and funeral expenses as well as the decedent's
lifetime liabilities that survive death.28 6 Although it might be ar-
gued that the recipients of nonprobate assets should not bear
the burden of statutory allowances or administration expenses,
the provision concerning priority of claims ensures that these
items will be recovered to the maximum possible extent from
probate assets.287 Similarly, it might be argued that nonprobate
assets should abate ratably with specific devises, but such treat-
ment would make the statute considerably more complex and
might unnecessarily expose nonprobate assets to a right of re-
covery while the probate estate remains solvent. 288 The priority
283 UPC § 6-215.
284 The UPC drafters may have deliberately avoided addressing creditors' rights in
the 1989 revisions to article 6 of the UPC to avoid losing support for statutory reform
and to enhance the attractiveness of the TOD form by comparison to "the highly troub-
lesome joint owner form." See Wellman, supra note 11, at 838-39.
280 UPC § 6-215 cmt.; cf. id. § 3-902 (abatement). Unlike the general abatement
rules, the right-of-recovery statute does not expressly yield to a different order if neces-
sary to preserve the decedent's dispositive plan. Frequently the terms of a funded inter
vivos trust permit or require payment to a deceased beneficiary's personal representative
of amounts needed for claims, taxes or expenses of administration. See Effland, supra
note 33, at 438 n.40. Presumably, in such a case, if the trustee (without breaching any
fiduciary duty) provides sufficient amounts to pay amounts that would otherwise be re-
coverable, the right-of-recovery statute should not apply.
288 See UPC § 1-201(6) (definition of "claims"). The original UPC included death
taxes in the recoverable amount, see UPC § 6-107 (pre-1989), but the 1989 UPC revi-
sions exclude them, presumably on the ground that the apportionment of liability for
death taxes is adequately covered in a separate provision. See UPC § 3-916 (death tax
apportionment).
287 See UPC § 3-805 (priority for payment of statutory allowances and expenses of
administration from probate assets).
288 Compare Hines, More Law, supra note 18, at 565 (recommending joint property
abate after probate assets) with Andrews, supra note 251, at 125 (recommending ratable
abatement). See also McGovern, supra note 11, at 28-29 (priority and apportionment
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of nonprobate assets over specific devises is no more arbitrary or
unfair than any other priority under the abatement rules, and
operates similarly to simplify the administration of probate and
nonprobate assets. By limiting the right of recovery to cases
where the probate estate is insolvent, the UPC preserves the ad-
vantages of avoiding administration as far as possible while rein-
forcing the priority of statutory allowances and claims over don-
ative transfers." 9
The UPC does not attempt to trace funds received from an
account, but imposes personal liability on the recipients for
amounts received. The recoverable amount is the lesser of (1)
the total amount received by surviving parties and POD benefi-
ciaries under the multiple-person account provisions at the
death of a party or (2) the total amount of statutory allowances
and claims remaining unpaid after exhausting the deceased
party's probate assets. The total recoverable amount is appor-
tioned among the surviving parties and POD beneficiaries in
proportion to the amounts received by each.29 0
Although the apportionment provision appears simple and
elegant, it may prove troublesome in practical operation. As-
sume, for example, that a deceased party leaves two single-party
accounts, each with a deathtime balance of $6000 and a different
POD beneficiary, and that $10,000 of statutory allowances and
claims remain unpaid after exhausting the probate assets. If
both beneficiaries are ascertained and solvent, each should be
liable for $5000. But what if one beneficiary is absent, unknown
or insolvent? Under the apportionment provision, the other ben-
eficiary may be liable for either $5000 or $6000, depending on
whether the uncollectible amount received by the delinquent
issues "are not likely to arise often, particularly if creditors can reach non-probate assets
only as a last resort").
2" The right-of-recovery statute improves the position of recipients of statutory al-
lowances (who might otherwise have no recourse against recipients of nonprobate assets)
and creditors when the probate estate is insolvent, while leaving nonprobate transfers
undisturbed when the probate estate is solvent. Of course, if it turns out that both the
decedents probate estate and the recipients of nonprobate asets are insolvent, the stat-
ute may fail to provide an effective remedy. See McGovern, supra note 11, at 28-29.
290 See UPC § 6-215(b). The apportionment provision, added by the 1959 UPC revi-
sions, ensures that a surviving party or POD beneficiary is not held accountable for more
than the amount actually received. Cf. UPC § 6-107 (pre-1989) (liability to account for
"amounts the decedent owned beneficially immediately before his death" to extent nec-
essary to pay recoverable amount).
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beneficiary is included in the apportionment. The literal terms
of the statute support the former result, but the latter result ap-
pears more consistent with its underlying purpose.
The UPC provides that a proceeding to recover amounts
from surviving parties or POD beneficiaries may be commenced
only after the deceased party's personal representative has re-
ceived a "written demand" from a surviving spouse, creditor or
child of the decedent and only within one year after death.01
The statute contemplates that such a proceeding may be
brought by the decedent's personal representative, since
amounts recovered "by the personal representative" are admin-
istered as part of the probate estate.9 2 Although the statute
does not expressly limit authority to initiate the proceeding to
the personal representative, such a limitation may be appropri-
ate even if it occasionally forces the opening of administration
for the sole purpose of exercising a right of recovery.9 3 When-
ever it becomes necessary to assert the right of recovery, the
probate estate will necessarily be insolvent, multiple creditors
are likely to be competing for the same limited nonprobate as-
sets, and administration offers a convenient and reliable proce-
dure for resolving competing claims.29 4 Moreover, the personal
representative is well situated to ascertain the existence and
terms of accounts and to coordinate recoveries from multiple
surviving parties or POD beneficiaries.295
29 Notice may also be given by "a person acting for a child" of the decedent. See
UPC § 6-215(b). The 1989 UPC revisions replace the two-year limitation under the orig-
inal UPC with a one-year limitation that corresponds to the "self-executing" bar on
claims. See id. §§ 3-803(a)(1), 6-215 cmt.; cf. UPC § 6-107 (pre-1989).
292 See UPC § 6-215(d).
293 Cf. id. § 3-710 (personal representative's exclusive authority to recover fraudu-
lently-transferred property to pay unsecured debts). The UPC permits a creditor to
qualify as personal representative if no other qualified person seeks an appointment. See
id. § 3-203(a)(6).
294 Of course, a creditor may still seek payment of a claim informally from recipients
of nonprobate assets; the statutory right of recovery may even encourage informal settle-
meits. See Hines, More Law, supra note 18, at 566-67 (administration produces orderly
collection and fair allocation); Effland, supra note 33, at 442 (administration avoids sepa-
rate proceedings for asserting claims against nonprobate assets). But cf. Andrews, supra
note 251, at 120-24 (arguing creditors should be permitted to proceed directly against
recipients of nonprobate assets).
29 A person against whom a proceeding is brought may join a surviving party or
POD beneficiary "of any other account of the decedent" as parties; joinder of a surviving
party or POD beneficiary of the same account should likewise be permitted. See UPC
§§ 6-215(b), (c).
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3. Expanding the Right of Recovery
The approach of the present UPC multiple-person account
provisions can readily be expanded to apply to a broad range of
will substitutes. The primary technical challenge lies in defining
the scope of property that should be available to satisfy an ex-
panded right of recovery.29 Once that question is addressed, the
statutory right of recovery for other will substitutes should oper-
ate in much the same manner as for multiple-person accounts
under the present UPC. Measuring the recoverable amount and
apportioning it among the recipients of different types of non-
probate assets raises no more administrative problems than in
the case of several different accounts under the present statute.
In the context of a multiple-person account, it seems self-
evident that the recoverable amount should be measured by the
deceased owner's net contributions, which define both the extent
of the owner's beneficial ownership and the rights of creditors
immediately before death. Implicit in the present statute is the
notion that the right of recovery should preserve the ability of a
deceased owner's creditors to reach property to the same extent
after death as immediately before death. Since the amount of
the decedent's net contributions would normally have been
available to satisfy creditors' claims during life,29 7 the transfer of
that amount at death to a surviving party or POD beneficiary
should neither enhance nor diminish creditors' rights with re-
spect to the account. Thus, an expanded right of recovery should
apply to nonprobate assets to the extent they were available im-
mediately before the owner's death to satisfy claims of the
owner's unsecured creditors.29 8
2 A right of recovery is probably preempted by federal law to the extent that it
"relate[s] to" ERISA-covered employee benefit plans. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) (1988) (preemption); Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc., 486
U.S. 825 (1988).
297 See, e.g., Giove v. Stanko. 882 F.2d 1316 (8th Cir. 1989); Nieman v. First Nat'l
Bank of Joplin, 420 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967); Union Properties, Inc. v. Cleveland
Trust Co., 89 N.E.2d 638 (Ohio 1949); Yakima Adjustment Serv., Inc. v. Durand, 622
P.2d 408 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981). But cf. Park Enter., Inc. v. Trach, 47 N.W.2d 194
(Minn. 1951).
29s This notion appears in the Missouri nonprobate transfers law. See Mo RE"
STAT. § 461.071 (1986 & Supp. 1992) (right of recovery against any person who receives
"property of [a] decedent.., that was subject to satisfaction of the decedents debts
during the decedents lifetime" outside the probate system). The Misouri right of recov-
ery does not apply to life insurance proceeds or to tenancy-by-the-entirety property,
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A distinct, though not necessarily inconsistent, approach fo-
cuses on the owner's beneficial rights immediately before
death.2 9 This approach reflects the notion that an owner should
not be able to possess and enjoy property during life and trans-
fer it at death without satisfying creditors' claims. The same no-
tion underlies the generally acknowledged public policy against
fraudulent transfers and self-settled spendthrift trusts. 00 This
approach may cause technical problems, especially as applied to
trust property. For example, if property held in a revocable trust
can be reached by the settlor's creditors during life, the trust
property should also be reachable at death, whether or not the
power of revocation constitutes beneficial ownership. On the
other hand, if the settlor retains a life income interest but no
power of revocation, creditors who are able to reach only trust
income during the settlor's life should not gain access to trust
corpus solely by reason of death. Similarly, if a person dies hold-
ing an unexercised general power of appointment over assets in
a trust created by another person, the creditors of the deceased
power holder should be able (or unable) to reach the trust prop-
erty to the same extent after death as during life.301 On balance,
the concept of beneficial ownership adds nothing to the basic
notion of preserving creditors' rights.
With respect to joint tenancy property other than a multi-
ple-party account with right of survivorship, 302 the expanded
which are largely sheltered from creditors' claims during life as well as after death. See
id. § 461.071.
299 This approach appeared in the original UPC, see UPC § 6-107 (pre-1989) (right
of recovery for amounts owned beneficially by decedent immediately before death), and
persists in the Missouri nonprobate transfers law. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 461.071 (1986 &
Supp. 1992) (liability for recoverable amount apportioned among recipients of nonpro-
bate assets in proportion to the deathtime value of their respective shares of "property
that the decedent owned beneficially immediately before death").
300 See SCOTT, supra note 13, § 156, at 164-69; see supra notes 261-62 and accompa-
nying text.
301 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Donative Transfers) § 13.2 (1984)
(unexercised general power of appointment created by person other than donee); but cl.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 461.071(3) (1986 & Supp. 1992) (right of recovery against recipients of
trust property subject to decedent's general power of appointment).
302 Under an expanded right of recovery, a multiple-party account with right of sur-
vivorship should continue to be treated as a revocable transfer (to the extent of the
respective net contributions) rather than as a joint tenancy.
An account or other property held in tenancy by the entirety is presently excluded
from the right of recovery under the UPC and the Missouri nonprobate transfers law.
See UPC § 6-216(b); Mo. REV. STAT. § 461.071 (1986 & Supp. 1992). At common law,
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right of recovery should similarly apply to the undivided frac-
tional share of the property that a deceased tenant's unsecured
creditors could have 'reached immediately before death.10 3 Thus,
if A purchases property in the names of A and B as joint tenants
with right of survivorship, intending to give B an undivided half
interest, and A dies insolvent survived by B, A's creditors should
be able to reach half the property either before or after A's
death; the same result should hold for B's creditors if B dies
insolvent survived by A. The general rule of permitting a dece-
dent's creditors to reach property to the same extent after death
as before operates more fairly and consistently than a rule based
on the tenants' respective contributions.30'
Thus, the scope of an expanded right of recovery should re-
flect the principle of affording a decedent's creditors equivalent
access to nonprobate assets after death as immediately before
death. Although the right of recovery will undoubtedly become
more complex to administer as it becomes applicable to multiple
beneficiaries of different will substitutes, the administrative bur-
den can be minimized by limiting the right of recovery to cases
property held in tenancy by the entirety is treated as owned by the marital unit as an
entity;, creditors of each individual spouse cannot reach the property. See, e.g., Strout
Realty, Inc. v. Henry, 758 S.W.2d 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Vaughn v. Spitz, 682 S.W.2d
847 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). In states that adhere to the common-law view, there is no
reason why creditors of either spouse should have greater rights after the debtor's death
than during life-even if both spouses die simultaneously.
3 See Effland, supra note 33, at 450 (proportionate-share rule is simple and consis-
tent with measurement of interests during joint lives); Andrevs, supra note 251, at 95-96
(recommending proportionate-share rule); Hines, More Law, supra note 18, at 559-62
(recommending rule measuring joint tenants' interests by respective contributions for all
types of property and allowing creditors to reach property to same extent after death as
before). Each joint tenant generally owns an equal undivided interest in the property
regardless of their respective net contributions, and creditors of any joint tenant can
reach only the debtor's fractional interest. See, e.g., Remax of Blue Springs v. Vajda &
Co., Inc., 708 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
30, The problem with a contribution-based rule is illustrated by the Missouri non-
probate transfers law, which provides that the right of recovery applies "only to the ex-
tent of the decedents contribution" to joint tenancy property. Mo. Rav STAT, 461.071(3)
(1986 & Supp. 1992). Under a contribution-based rule, if A dies first, A's creditors may
reach the full value of the property after A's death even though they could have reached
only half its value during A's life. (B's creditors, of course, may also seek to reach the
entire value of the property after A's death. Presumably, if part of the property is recov-
ered to pay A's creditors, the value available to B's creditors should be correspondingly
reduced.) Conversely, if B dies first, a contribution-based rule prevents B's creditors
from reaching any of the property after B's death even though they could have reached
half its value during B's life.
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in which the probate estate is insolvent and by channeling pro-
ceedings through the probate system. Within its proper sphere,
the probate system represents an orderly, unified procedure for
collecting assets, determining the solvency of the estate and pay-
ing statutory allowances and claims. 0 5
It may seem ironic that a comprehensive statutory frame-
work designed to validate and implement a broad range of will
substitutes ultimately falls back on the probate procedures it
was designed to avoid. But it should be clear that will substi-
tutes ultimately rely on the probate system to resolve the inevi-
table cases in which uncertainties, disputes and competing
claims require more than ministerial attention.306
CONCLUSION
Will substitutes flourish because they implement simple,
routine deathtime transfers more promptly and efficiently than
the probate system. Although they resemble specific devises in
many respects, will substitutes dispense with the formal and
procedural safeguards of the probate system. To reduce the risk
of fraud or mistake, a general validating statute should apply to
arrangements administered by accountable third-party payors or
meeting prescribed alternative formalities. In framing construc-
tional rules, the revised UPC achieves substantial parity be-
tween wills and will substitutes. At the same time, the UPC still
lacks a mechanism for resolving creditors' claims with respect to
most nonprobate assets. Refining the blanket validating statute
and clarifying the rights of creditors represent the next steps to-
ward realizing the UPC drafters' goal of integrating the law of
wills and will substitutes.
305 See Effland, supra note 33, at 442 ("troublesome questions about how and when
the claimant should proceed to establish his claim are avoided by channeling all claims
through the regular administration process"); Hines, More Law, supra note 18, at 567-68
(recommending centralized estate administration rather than separate procedures by
particular claimants).
306 See Langbein, supra note 1, at 1120 ("Financial intermediaries execute easy
transfers and shunt the hard ones over to probate.... In the nonprobate system, genuine
disputes still reach the courts, but routine administration does not.").
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